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The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of 
"Stop" and. "Arrest" 
RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is, perhaps, no aspect of criminal jurisprudence more important 
than that which governs the decision to deprive an individual of his or her 
freedom of movement prior to adjudication of guilt or innocence. 1 The 
framers of the Bill of Rights understandably sought to limit and control the 
circumstances under which the government could take a person suspected of 
criminal activity into custody. The decision to restrict freedom of movement, 
whether in the form of the familiar "arrest" of a person suspected of com-
mitting a crime or in the form of a temporary forcible detention for purposes 
of questioning or investigation, is governed by the fourth amendment's guar-
antee of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against 
unreasonable searches and seizures ... .'' 2 
Surprisingly, the development of the law governing seizures of people 
has been the stepchild of fourth amendment jurisprudence. During the past 
two decades especially, the Supreme Court has been preoccupied with the 
task of defining the nature and scope of the individual privacy right secured by 
the amendment. 3 The nature and scope of the limitations on the right of the 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
B.B.A., Ohio University, 1965; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 1968. 
I. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. cr. REV. 46, 47. 
See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 4ll, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
The initial decision to deprive or restrict freedom of movement prior to adjudication of guilt or innocence 
must be distinguished from the related question of the legality of pretrial restraints once a determination has 
been made that the initial deprivation was lawful. When an individual has been lawfully taken into custody and 
charged with a crime, the right of a government to impose pretrial restraints designed to ensure his or her 
presence at trial is firmly established. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I, 4-5 (1951); U.S. CONSf. amend. VIII; cf. 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (before extended pretrial restraints may be imposed there must be a 
judicial determination of probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime). See generally Thaler, 
Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. 
L. REV. 441; Wald,PretrialDetentionand Ultimate Freedom:AStatisticalStudy, 39N. Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which reads in full as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
3. Although this is not an exhaustive listing, serious students of the fourth amendment will recognize such 
leading search cases as United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); 
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Mapp v. 
772 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:771 
government to restrict individual freedom of movement is the last great un-
explored area of the fourth amendment. In short order the Supreme Court has 
decided a number of cases that have concerned seizures of people in a variety 
of situations. Although all the problems have not been resolved yet, as the 
discussion that follows demonstrates, the Court's recent efforts have clarified 
much of the uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the amendment's 
protections in the context of preadjudication seizures of people. 
The belatedness of the Court's efforts in this area is understandable. The 
exclusionary rule has been the principal mechanism for judicial enforcement 
of fourth amendment rights. 4 During the past twenty years the Supreme Court 
has promulgated numerous rules limiting the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. 5 If the alleged constitu-
tional violation produced no evidence used directly or indirectly at trial, or if 
no prosecution followed, the pressures to define the limits of the challenged 
government activity would not be present. In the case of an unconstitutional 
seizure of an individual, the only direct adjudicatory consequence flowing 
from the illegal activity would be the physical presence of the accused in 
court. The Supreme Court has long adhered to the position that the unlawful 
seizure of an accused, standing alone, presents no bar to prosecution and 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For an excellent treatment of the development of fourth amendment law during the 
past two decades, see Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the 
Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980). See also Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth 
Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335 (1978). 
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule was made applicable to the states by Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1%1). For an excellent discussion of the justification for the rule and the problems it 
presents, see Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspecti>·e: The 
Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than an "Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); 
Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDI-
CATURE 351 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 
(1978). 
5. The number of exclusionary rule cases-cases in which suppression was argued as a consequence of 
alleged fourth amendment violations-is legion. In most of these cases the controversy did not concern direct 
challenges to the exclusionary rule as an appropriate remedy; instead, the focus of the arguments was the 
substance of the alleged fourth amendment violation. Recently, however, a number of cases have arisen in 
which questions have been raised concerning the exclusionary rule as an appropriate remedy for an assumed 
fourth amendment violation. In some of these cases the challenge to the exclusionary rule has been direct and in 
the context of a controversy over the suppression of the direct fruits of an unlawful search. See Rakas v. IUinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 130 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498-500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). In other cases the challenge to the exclusionary rule has been in the context of attempts to suppress 
the indirect fruits of an illegal search or seizure. See United States v. Ceccolini, 453 U.S. 268 (1978). 
The Supreme Court also has recognized limits on the exclusionary rule depending on the forum or pro-
cedural context in which it is urged. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976); and United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
The most recent challenge to the exclusionary rule has been an attempt to remove applicability of the rule 
from cases entailing good faith conduct by the police. The well-publicized case of United States v. Williams, 622 
F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), represents one of the most recent judicial 
attempts to establish a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
501~2 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The good faith exception has been criticized. See generally LaFave, 
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 
(1982); Comment, Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Exception-The Fifth Circuit's Approach in United States v. 
Williams, 15 GA. L. REV. 487 (1981). For a discussion of a variation on the good faith standard, see Burkoff, 
Bad Faith Searches, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (1982). 
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conviction. 6 In addition, many instances exist in which an unlawful seizure 
will not be followed by prosecution. Hence, a defendant will have no oppor-
tunity, other than by way of a civil suit against the offending officials, to 
challenge the legality of a seizure. 7 
The collateral consequences of unlawful seizures have been substantial, 
however, and undoubtedly have contributed to the pressures to clarify the 
constitutional doctrines applicable to the seizure process. Under existing 
fourth amendment doctrine the government may, without a warrant and in the 
absence of probable cause, search the person of an arrestee and the area 
within his or her immediate control. 8 The constitutional predicate for the right 
to search incident to arrest is a lawful arrest. 9 If the arrest does not satisfy 
fourth amendment standards, the "derivative evidence" component of the 
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of tangible evidence obtained in 
the search. 10 Likewise, a seizure of an individual may provide the opportunity 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. !03, 119 (1975); 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v.lllinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). In Frisbie the defendant was forcibly 
removed from his Chicago home by Michigan law enforcement officials and taken back to Michigan for prosecu-
tion. The Court stated that it had never "departed from the rule announced in [Ker], that the power of a court to 
try a person ••• is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court'sjurisdiction by reason of 
a forcible abduction." 342 U.S. 519,522 (1952). See also United States v. Gengler, 5!0 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied sub nom. Lujan v. Gengler, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973). But see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
7. A civil action for damages against state officials under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 is possible, Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961), but the officials will enjoy a good faith defense, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See 
also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). In certain circumstances a suit for damages may be asserted against 
a local government, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the city may not 
have a good faith defense, Owens v. City oflndependence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980). A similar cause of action 
for damages may be asserted against federal law enforcement officials. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Once an individual litigates and loses the fourth amendment claim in the criminal prosecu-
tion, however, the principle of collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of the claim in a civil suit against the 
offending officials. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
8. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United 
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). But see New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (extending the right to search to the entire interior of an automobile). 
9. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The statement that the right to search incident to arrest is 
predicated in the first instance on a lawful arrest is misleading. The actual time sequence of the search and the 
formal arrest apparently is inconsequential if they are substantially contemporaneous. See, e.g., Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Italiano v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 334, 200 S.E.2d 526 (1973). The Court 
clearly has held, however, that the evidence or information obtained through the search incident to arrest may 
not be used to justify the arrest retroactively. United States v. Henry, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
!0. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). The issue of the admissibility of evidence directly seized 
pursuant to a search incident to arrest normally is not viewed as a derivative evidence or fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree problem. Instead, it commonly is viewed as an illegal search in itself. Although the outcome is the same no 
matter how the problem is articulated, to view it as a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree problem arguably is more 
accurate, the poisonous tree being the illegal arrest. 
The statement that if the arrest falls short of meeting fourth amendment standards it is unlawful and 
evidence seized pursuant to a search incident thereto must be suppressed is accurate to some extent. An arrest, 
however, may be unlawful for other reasons that have nothing to do with the fourth amendment. For example, 
an arrest may be unlawful under state law requiring an arrest warrant, especially in misdemeanor cases. See, 
e.g., VA. CODE§ 19.2-SI (Supp. 1982). Whether the exclusionary rule should bar the admissibility of evidence 
seized pursuant to an unlawful arrest under state law is unclear. Cf. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th 
Cir. 1974). 
Another variation on the problem was presented in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). In 
DeFil/ippo the Court held that a search incident to arrest made with probable cause could not be invalidated by 
challenging the constitutionality of the substantive criminal statute under which the arrest was made. Thus, even 
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to question the person and obtain incriminating statements for use at trial, il to 
obtain information leading to the discovery of other evidence, including evi-
dence sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest, 12 to obtain fingerprints 
or other incriminating evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the 
accused, 13 or to provide for witnesses to view the suspect for identification 
purposes. 14 A seizure of a suspected criminal, in other words, may not only 
serve the utilitarian function of making criminal prosecution possible by pro-
viding a body in court against whom to prosecute the case; it also may en-
hance investigatory goals by providing the opportunity to obtain evidence. If 
the seizure that produces the opportunity to obtain the incriminating evidence 
is constitutionally infirm, the derivative evidence concept should preclude in 
most instances the use of evidence thereby obtained.15 
The consequences to the individual of a governmental seizure prior to 
adjudication of guilt or innocence are likewise substantial, although more 
difficult to quantify. The individual whose freedom of movement has been 
restricted incurs more than a "petty indignity." 16 This person suffers the 
humiliation of being taken into custody; he or she may be fingerprinted, 
photographed, and detained for at least the time necessary to arrange for bail, 
and may acquire an arrest record that will remain for the rest of his or her 
life. 17 If the restrictions are prolonged, they may imperil a job, interrupt one's 
source of income, and impair family relationships. 18 
if the substantive statute is invalidated on the merits, rendering the arrest unlawful (at least in a technical sense), 
the fruits of the search undertaken before the statute was invalidated would be admissible in a prosecution for 
violation of another valid statute. 
ll. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
12. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
13. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (scrapings from the defendant's fingernails); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973) (voice exemplars); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood samples); cf. Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982) 
(fingerprints). 
14. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). 
15. The derivative evidence or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine was applied first in Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Justice Holmes' description of the concept and the limits of 
its use remains instructive: 
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this 
does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is 
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by 
the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. 
Id. at 392. 
Not all evidence is a fruit of the poisonous tree just because it would not have been discovered but for the 
primary illegality. The test is "whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality the evidence ••• has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF 
GUILT 221 (1959)). 
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that there are limits to how far the doctrine can be 
extended. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,470-74 (1980); and United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 273-79 (1978). 
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 17 (1968). 
17. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 46, 47. 
18. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 _u.s, IQ3, ll4 (1975). 
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Given the significant personal consequences that follow a seizure and, in 
the event of prosecution, the potential collateral evidentiary concerns, the 
need for greater emphasis on controlling principles has been substantial. Dur-
ing the past six years the Supreme Court has decided cases that (1) defined the 
role of the warrant process in the decision to restrict freedom of movement; 19 
(2) further limited the use of temporary investigative detentions;20 (3) reaf-
firmed and clarified the authority of the government to "control" the actions 
of persons lawfully seized;21 (4) reaffirmed and clarified the standards by 
which a court judges the factual quantum and quality of information that is 
necessary under the fourth amendment to support a seizure of an individual;22 
and (5) determined that the derivative evidence component of the exclusion-
ary rule, although still viable in situations concerning the illegal seizure of an 
individual, is not unlimited. 23 Although the Supreme Court has resolved many 
19. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment does not require that the police frrst secure an 
arrest warrant before making an arrest in a public place for a felony. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 4Il 
(1976). The Court also has held, however, that if extended restrictions on liberty are imposed following arrest, 
the government must promptly submit the information constituting probable cause for arrest to a review by an 
independent magistrate. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). 
20. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 195--201. 
21. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 219-21. In Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Supreme Court held that patrons on public preritises which were to be searched 
under the authority of a search warrant could not be frisked or searched merely because of propinquity to others 
suspected of criminal activity. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), the Court upheld 
the right of a police officer to order the driver of an automobile to alight following a traffic stop. See infra text 
accompanying notes 223-24. See generally Comment, Orders to Alight: Opening the Door to a New Traffic Stop 
Search and Seizure Rule, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 171 (1981). 
22. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 4II (1981); Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Dunaway 
confirmed the concept of probable cause as the standard that must be met to justify an arrest of a suspect. 442 
U.S. 200, 216 (1979). The remaining cases deal with the concept of reasonable suspicion as the stalldard that 
must be met to justify the less intrusive form of seizure, often referred to as a stop. Cortez held that the 
reasonable suspicion standard must be evaluated by the "totality of the circumstances-the whole picture" 
confronting the police, but that the detaining officer "must have a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." 449 U.S. 4Il, 417 (1981). Cortez also held that the 
police could consider "modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers" although inferences of 
criminal activity drawn from such conduct "might well elude an untrained person." !d. 
Summers held that the requisite reasonable suspicion for detaining an occupant of a dwelling that is about to 
be searched under a warrant could be found in the mere connection of the occupant to the home. 452 U.S. 692, 
70~ ( 198 I). See infra text accompanying note 227. Brown, on the other hand, held that a person's presence in 
a neighborhood frequented by drug users was not sufficient to support a conclusion that he was engaged in 
criminal conduct. 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. 
Reid and Mendenhall both deal with the use of the drug courier profile as a basis for detaining suspects in 
the nation's airports. The Court in Mendenhall did not resolve the question of the propriety of using profiles to 
establish reasonable suspicion. See infra text accompanying notes 64-66. In Reid the Court invalidated a seizure 
that was based in part on the officers' conclusion that the suspects exhibited characteristics consistent with the 
Atlanta drug courier profile. 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980). 
A case is pending in the Supreme Court in which the propriety of the use ofadrugcourierproflle is likely to 
be confronted directly. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1079 
(1981). 
23. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States 
v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Taylor, Rawlings, and Dunaway 
concerned claims that confessions or admissions obtained following an illegal detention were inadmissible fruits 
of the poisonous tree even though the suspects had been given Miranda warnings. All three cases confirmed the 
holding in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), that the giving of the Miranda warnings is a relevant, but not a 
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of the direct and indirect issues arising under a claim that an individual was 
seized illegally, fundamental questions remain unanswered. 
It goes without saying that not every case is a fourth amendment case. 24 
More accurate and to tlie point, not every situation in which an individual 
believes that his or her freedom of movement has been restricted by law 
enforcement officers constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. Many cases arise in which defendants argue that evidence ob-
tained and used against them at trial was the product, directly or indirectly, of 
an illegal seizure. But in many of these cases a question remains whether a 
seizure occurred prior to the discovery or disclosure of the evidence that 
allegedly is tainted. Unless an unlawful seizure occurred prior to the dis-
covery of the evidence, the derivative evidence principle will not operate to 
exclude the evidence.25 Thus, to fully define the scope of fourth amendment 
limits on seizures of people, the Supreme Court must not only defme the 
circumstances under which a seizure will be permissible, 26 but it also must 
define with specificity the types of activity that constitute a seizure. The 
Supreme Court's development of a two-tier system of analysis of fourth 
amendment rights has complicated the attempt to identify the essential com-
ponents of a seizure. 27 Intrusions (seizures) in the nature of limited restric-
tions on freedom of movement are permitted in circumstances in which prob-
able cause to arrest is lacking, but the government has reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity is present. 28 This type of government seizure is com-
monly referred to as a "stop." 29 All seizures of people in which the intrusion 
on individual freedom is greater than the limited intrusion authorized upon 
decisive, consideration in determining whether a confession obtained following an illegal seizure is admissible. 
Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664,2668 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980); Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211-18 (1979). 
Crews held that, under the facts of the case, an eyewitness' in-court identification was not tainted by a 
pretrial identification by the witness, which was inadmissible because the defendant had been seized illegally. 
According to the Court, "[T]he toxin in this case [the illegal seizure] was injected only after the evidentiary bud 
[the witness' observations at the time of the crime] had blossomed; the fruit served at trial was not poisoned." 
445 u.s. 463, 472 (1980). 
24. Cf. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265,267 
(1981). 
25. This statement represents nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that the exclusionary rule 
operates to suppress evidence only when it is the product of a prior illegality. In the context of evidence 
allegedly derived from an illegal seizure, an illegal seizure of the defendant first must be established. 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
21. See generally Comment, Considering the Two-Tier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U.L. 
REV. 85 (1981). 
28. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)). 
Although the term "reasonable suspicion" has been used to describe the test, courts also have used "articulable 
reasons" or "founded suspicion" as synonomous descriptive terms. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 
(1981). A more precise statement, however, might be as follows: "An investigatory stop must be justified by 
some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143, 146-49 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16-19 (1968). 
29. The term "stop" first appeared in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 10 (1968). 
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reasonable suspicion are characterized as an "arrest" and are valid only if 
justified by probable cause. 30 
Therefore, just as it is not always self-evident that a seizure has occurred, 
it may not be clear whether a particular seizure was a stop that could be 
justified on reasonable suspicion or was, rather, an arrest that required prob-
able cause. If the quantum and quality of facts known to the officers at the 
time of the seizure constituted reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, 
the legality of the seizure will depend on whether the seizure was of the 
limited variety authorized (a stop) or was, instead, an arrest. Thus, the Court 
must not only define the circumstances in which a stop will be authorized (as 
opposed to those in which an arrest is constitutionally permissible), it must 
also define with particularity the factual difference between the two types of 
seizures. In sum, every significant restriction of freedom of movement is a 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but not every seizure is 
an arrest requiring the support of probable cause. Not every police-citizen 
encounter, however, involves a significant restriction of freedom of move-
ment, and thus, not every such encounter is a seizure. 
A substantial number of cases in lower federal courts and in state courts 
have considered attempts to suppress evidence alleged to be the fruit of an 
illegal seizure. 31 In these cases the courts have been confronted with one of 
the following questions. First, did the activities of the government that led to 
the discovery or disclosure of the evidence constitute a "seizure" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment?32 If no seizure occurred prior to the dis-
covery or development of the evidence sought to be suppressed, no fourth 
amendment question is presented. Second, if a seizure occurred and if the 
seizure served as an essential link in the development of the evidence sought 
to be suppressed, was the seizure in the nature of a stop or an aqest?33 If the 
information used to justify the seizure was less than probable cause, but suffi-
cient to constitute reasonable suspicion, the characterization of the seizure as 
an arrest rather than as a stop will result in a finding of an illegal seizure, but if 
the seizure is found to constitute a stop it will be proper. 
This Article will undertake a critical examination of these issues. How do 
we determine when there has been a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment? And how do we distinguish between seizures in the nature of a 
stop and those that constitute an arrest? 
As the succeeding material demonstrates, two tests currently are em-
30. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
31. See infra cases cited in notes 32-33. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); State 
v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 883 (1981). 
33. See, e.g., Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384, 540 P.2d 632, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975). 
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ployed to resolve these issues. First, when the issue presented is whether a 
citizen has been seized, the question is whether the individual's freedom of 
movement has been significantly restricted by the actions of law enforcement 
officials, as determined from the perspective of a reasonable person under the 
circumstances. 34 Second, when the issue presented is whether the seizure was 
a stop or an arrest, the question is whether the restriction was more intrusive 
than the brief encounter for questioning authorized by Terry v. Ohio 35 and its 
progeny (''intrusiveness'' under current standards is a function, largely, of the 
temporal and spatial scope of the seizure). 36 
A significant portion of this Article will be devoted to developing the 
thesis that the current method of analysis utilized by courts to resolve these 
issues under the tests previously described is incomplete and fails to protect 
fully the values implicit in the fourth amendment's proscription against un-
reasonable seizures. This Article will argue that the intrusiveness of an en-
counter between a citizen and law enforcement officials should be viewed as 
an element not only of the extent to which freedom of movement is restricted 
but also of the extent to which law enforcement evidence-gathering objectives 
are furthered. The intrusiveness of law enforcement activities in this respect 
operates in two important ways to resolve issues such as whether a seizure 
has occurred under the circumstances or whether the seizure was a stop or 
an arrest. First, when the activities of law enforcement officials convey the 
impression that an investigation of specific and identifiable criminal activity 
has commenced and they have reason to believe that the citizen is involved or 
possesses relevant information, a reasonable person is more likely to believe 
that he or she is not free to ignore the official request and walk away. Thus, 
for example, when the questions asked clearly are linked to specific and 
identifiable criminal activity and designed to elicit incriminating responses, 
the intrusion on individual privacy is greater than that occasioned by general 
questioning unrelated to any specific criminal activity, and the impression 
conveyed to the citizen is viewed more reasonably as an official investigation 
from which he or she is not free to depart. Second, when a seizure has 
occurred and the question is whether the seizure constitutes a stop or an 
arrest, the relevance of the intrusiveness of the encounter, in the sense of 
circumstances other than the actual loss of freedom of movement, is more 
apparent. The ability to detain a suspected criminal frequently enhances 
police investigatory objectives. As a result of a forcible encounter with law 
enforcement officials, a suspect may be questioned and subjected to ev-
idence-gathering objectives that are not, as such, protected by the fourth 
amendment right of privacy, but that are dependent upon the government's 
right to custody of the suspect. Thus, although a suspect's likeness, voice, 
hair, or fingerprints have been characterized as exposed to the public and, 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 104-13. 
35. 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 204-25. 
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therefore, generally not entitled to fourth amendment protection,37 the 
government frequently will be unable to obtain this evidence without the 
ability to detain the suspect or to control his or her movements. 
When the government obtains the right to detain a suspect, the individual 
loses the right to avoid contact with law enforcement officials and thereby 
loses perhaps not a right of privacy in a strict sense, but a more general right 
of privacy in the form ofthe right to control access to information. When the 
purpose of a seizure is the discovery of evidence otherwise constitutionally 
protected, such as admissions or confessions 38 or personal items in the per-
son's possession at the time of the seizure, 39 the detention may be exploited to 
provide the opportunity to obtain such evidence. In the absence of prolonged 
detention or detention in a police-controlled environment, successful ques-
tioning of a suspect may be frustrated. 40 A detention of a suspect also implicit-
ly carries the authority to detain personal items possessed at the time by the 
suspect. Detention of the suspect (and thereby the detention of his or her 
personal possessions) may provide the time necessary for law enforcement 
officials to gain lawful access to those possessions. 41 The intrusiveness of a 
seizure as previously described, therefore, is linked inextricably to privacy 
concerns and not just to the length and scope of the loss of individual freedom 
of movement. 
ll. WHEN Is A PERSON SEIZED WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT? 
A. General Considerations 
The Supreme Court's efforts to define the concept of seizure have pro-
duced less than definite standards. In perhaps its most expansive treatment of 
the question, Terry v. Ohio, 42 the Court held that "[i]t is quite plain that the 
37. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973); Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967) ("What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public .•• is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."). 
38. Individuals have a constitutional right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
39. The individual's constitutional right of privacy respecting items on his or her person at the time of a 
seizure may, of course, be lost under the "right ... always recognized under English and American law" to 
search a person incident to arrest. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). See also New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969). 
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 451 (1966). 
41. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977); cf. United 
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). Sanders held that the defendant's suitcase, seized from the trunk of the 
taxi in which he was riding at the time of his arrest and for which probable cause to search existed, could not be 
opened without a warrant. Instead, the police were required to seize the suitcase and retain possession until a 
warrant was obtained. 442 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1979). Earlier, Chadwick had applied the same reasoning to any 
item, not associated immediately with the person of the arrestee, taken incident to arrest. 433 U.S. I, 15 ( 1977). 
Edwards concerned the warrantless seizure of clothing worn by the accused at the time of his arrest. The 
seizure occurred some ten hours following arrest. The seizure was upheld, even though it was not substantially 
contemporaneous with the arrest, because the intrusion was no greater than that which could have taken place 
at the time of the arrest. 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974). See supra note 9. 
42. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
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Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate 
in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional 
terminology. " 43 The Terry opinion also advises that "whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 
'seized' that person" and that a seizure "takes place whenever a law enforce-
ment officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority,' has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen." 44 On the other hand, the Terry 
opinion warns that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and 
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons." 45 In perhaps its most prophetic state-
ment on the subject, the Terry opinion also cautions that street encounters 
between citizens and police officers are "incredibly rich in diversity." 46 
· Aside from these generalities, the Terry case itself provided little guid-
ance in the resolution of a close case. In Terry, after the officer had ap-
proached the suspects on the street, he identified himself as a police officer 
and asked the suspects for their names. When the men mumbled something in 
response, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around so that he was 
between the officer and the other two men, and patted down the outside of his 
clothing. 47 On these facts, the Court held that "there can be no question, 
then, that [the officer] 'seized' petitioner ... when he took hold of him and 
patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. " 48 The ambiguity of the out-
come in Terry was generated by qualifying language in the opinion that 
indicated the Court was unable to determine on the record "whether any such 
'seizure' took place [before the officer initiated] physical contact for purposes 
of searching [the defendant] for weapons," but the Court "assume[ d) that up 
to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had oc-
curred.'' 49 This assumption would appear to have been warranted, but only if 
one also assumes, as did Justice White in his concurring opinion in Terry, that 
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from ad-
dressing questions to anyone on the streets,'' 50 and also assumes, as did 
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion, that in such cases "the person 
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." 51 
At first blush, Justices White and Harlan could be accused of stating the 
obvious and adding little to the resolution of the problem. Clearly, a police 
officer does not lose his right as an ordinary citizen to initiate conversation 
with others. Just as clear is the right of a citizen to avoid such conversation, 
and simply because he or she seeks to avoid a law enforcement officer does 
43. !d. at 16. 
44. !d. at 19 n.l6. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 13. 
47. !d. at 6-7. The officer's interest in the defendants was generated by their suspicious behavior; spe-
cifically, the officer believed that the defendants were "casing a job, a stick-up." !d. at 5-6. 
48. !d. at 19. 
49. !d. at 19 n.l6. 
50. !d. at 34 (White, J ., concurring). 
5 I. !d. at 32-33 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
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not and should not alter the situation. On the other hand, a slight modification 
of the principles proffered by Justices White and Harlan demonstrates the 
essence of the problem that has plagued the lower courts and that is at the 
heart of the difficulty in defining what constitutes a seizure. As the Supreme 
Court itself has recognized, "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a 
police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that 
the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately 
cause the suspect to be charged with a crime." 52 Professor Wayne LaFave 
has gone even further and has argued that whenever a police officer ap-
proaches a person and seeks an explanation for his activities or some evi-
dence of identification, a show of authority is implicit; therefore, if the ulti-
mate issue is whether a reasonable person would feel free to walk away, 
virtually all police-citizen encounters would constitute seizures. 53 Existing 
case law, of course, rejects the LaFave argument and continues to take the 
position that no seizure exists in police-citizen encounters which take 
place under circumstances in which the citizen's freedom to walk away is not 
limited by anything other than his desire to cooperate. 54 In the absence of 
imposition of physical restraints or unequivocal verbal instructions from the 
police officer that the person is not free to leave, the question to be answered, 
therefore, must be instead: What circumstances should control the decision 
whether, under the circumstances, a seizure has occurred? 
The only Supreme Court decision since Terry that provides extended 
discussion of the concept of seizure is United States v. Mendenhall. 55 
52. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 ( 1977) (per curiam). The Mathiason case was concerned with 
the concept of''custodial interrogation," as that standard was used in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
to establish the circumstances under which Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning. See infra text 
accompanying note 161. The relationship between the concept of seizure and that of custody for purposes of the 
Miranda warnings never has been explored fully. A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when he has 
been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). 
The concept of custody, therefore, is similar, if not identical, to the broad definition of seizure. See supra text 
accompanying note 44. If the person has been seized pursuant to a Terry stop and is questioned, Miranda would 
appear to be applicable and the warnings should be given. The cases in the lower federal courts and in state 
courts have had some difficulty reconciling the two concepts. See, e.g. United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); United States 
v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1979); State v. Wynn, 
114 Ariz. 561, 562 P.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1977); McMillan v. United States, 373 A.2d 912 (D.C. 1977); State v. 
Bohanan, 220 Kan. 121, 551 P.2d 828 (1976). 
53. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.2, at 50 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE, SEARCH]. Professor LaFave's conclusion is shared by others. See 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § I 10.1 commentary at 258 (Proposed Official Draft 1975) 
(many citizens will defer to police authority because they believe in some vague way that they should); L. 
TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 17 (1967) ("In high crime areas, particu-
larly, persons who stop and answer police questions do so for a variety of reasons, including a willingness to 
cooperate with police, a fear of police, a belief that a refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a combination of 
all three."). 
54. E.g., United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978). 
55. 446 U.S.544 (1980). In the companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court 
avoided resolution of the seizure issue because the record was unclear. /d. at 63. The officer had observed 
Sib ron in the presence of several known addicts. Sibron entered a restuarant where he was seen talking to three 
other addicts. The officer entered and asked him to step outside. Once outside, the officer said, "You know 
what rm after." When Sibron "mumbled something and reached in his pocket," the officer also reached into 
Sibron 's pocket and discovered heroin. /d. at 44-46. The Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether a 
seizure occurred at the time the officer asked Sibron to step outside. Id. at 63. 
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Mendenhall, unfortunately, provides no definite guidance because of the 
absence of a working majority on the issues of whether and when a seizure 
occurred. 56 In Mendenhall agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
approached the defendant, a black female, on the public concourse of the 
Detroit airport after observing her conduct while departing from a flight. Her 
behavior was considered characteristic of persons trafficking in narcotics. 57 
The agents, two white males, identified themselves as federal agents and 
asked to see the defendant's identification and airline ticket. She produced a 
driver's license and ticket, each showing a different name. When asked by 
one of the agents to explain the discrepancy, she said that she "just felt like 
using that name" -the name which appeared on the ticket. 58 In response to a 
further question that apparently was directed to the length of her stay in 
California, she indicated that she had been there only two days. 59 The agents 
then identified themselves as federal narcotic agents, and according to the 
officers, the defendant became "quite shaken, extremely nervous," and "had 
a hard time speaking." 60 The agents returned her license and ticket and asked 
if she would accompany them to the DEA office for further questions. The 
defendant agreed 61 and, subsequently, was searched and found to be carrying 
heroin. 62 The Court of Appeals suppressed the heroin on the ground that the 
discovery of the heroin was the fruit of an unconstitutional detention that 
occurred in the concourse. 63 The Supreme Court reversed. 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 64-66. Because of this division and the lack of a majority view, 
several courts have held that Mendenhall is not controlling. See United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 
219 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir. 1980). 
57. 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.l (1980). According to the agents, the defendant attracted their attention because 
she had arrived on a flight from Los Angeles, a major source of heroin brought to Detroit. She appeared nervous 
and was the last person to leave the plane. She "scanned" the whole area. She proceeded past the baggage area 
without retrieving any luggage, and she changed to a different airline for a departing flight. Id. The use of the 
so-called drug courier profile has caused problems for numerous courts. See Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, 
Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 
52-53 (1981). Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule specifically on the propriety of using such profileS, it is 
likely to do so in the near future. See Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. granted, 
454 U.S. 1079 (1981). The profile used in Royer identified the defendant as a suspect because (I) the defendant 
was carrying American Tourister baggage, the standard brand for marijuana smuggling; (2) the defendant 
appeared nervous; (3) he paid for his ticket in cash from a roll of small denomination bills; and (4) rather than 
filling out a full name •. address, and phone number on the baggage tags, he wrote on them the words "Holt" and 
"LaGuardia." 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (1980). 
Courts have approved the use of profiles in other contexts. See United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 
(5th Cir. 1973) (hijacking profile), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 902 (1974); United States v. Forbicetta, 484 F.2d 645 
(5th Cir. 1973) (customs search), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); State v. Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582,544 P.2d 1097 
(1976) (use of a profile to detect stolen vehicles). 
58. 446 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1980). Her identification bore her true name, but the airline ticket was issued in 
the name of Annette Ford. Id. 
59. ld. at 548. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. The defendant did not respond verbally to the request but did accompany the agents to the DEA 
office. Mr. Justice Stewart's characterization of the trip to the DEA office as consensual was made more 
difficult because one of the agents testified that had the defendant attempted to leave he would have stopped 
her. ld. at 575 n.l2 (White, J., dissenting). 
62. ld. at 548. Once at the DEA office, one of the agents asked if she would permit a search of her handbag 
and person. The agent informed the defendant that she had the right to refuse, but she nevertheless agreed to the 
search. A strip search uncovered two small packages of heroin concealed in her clothing. Id. 
63. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1979). 
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Two members of the Court, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, held that no 
seizure had occurred in the public concourse and that the defendant had 
consented voluntarily to accompany the agents to the DEA offices. 64 Four 
members of the Court disagreed. They argued that the defendant had been 
seized during the encounter with the DEA agents in the concourse and that 
the seizure was unlawful because the officers had lacked reasonable grounds 
for suspecting her of criminal activity. 65 The remaining three Justices as-
sumed that the encounter in the concourse was a seizure, but held that the 
encounter was lawful since the officers had had reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. These three Justices, in an 
opinion written by Justice Powell, found the seizure question "extremely 
close," although they were not necessarily prepared to support Justice 
Stewart's contention that no seizure had occurred. 66 Although Mendenhall 
provides no controlling opinion on the proper focus of inquiry when resolving 
the question whether a seizure has occurred under a given set of circum-
stances, the opinions of Justices Stewart and White do identify certain con-
siderations that may be relevant to the resolution of the question in a partic-
ular case and that tend to narrow the focus of inquiry. Thus, although not 
constituting controlling precedent, the two opinions are worthy of considera-
tion. 
Justice Stewart began analysis of the question whether a seizure had 
occurred in the concourse by accepting the definition of seizure that first 
appeared in Terry: "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or 
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we 
conclude that a •seizure' has occurred." 67 According to Justice Stewart, "As 
long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the 
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's 
liberty . . . as would under the Constitution require some particularized and 
objective justification." 68 Justice Stewart next focused on the problem that is 
present in many cases: the existence of evidence that the officer subjectively 
intended or believed at the time of the encounter that the individual was free 
to leave, while the individual subjectively believed that he was not free to 
leave. Justice Stewart argued that a seizure would arise "within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave." 69 Specifically, the officer's subjective intent to detain a 
64. 446 u.s. 544, 555-57 (1980). 
65. /d. at 566 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice White's 
dissent. The dissenting Justices said that the agent's justification for the seizure was "'his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch,"' rather than' "specific" reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from facts in light of his experience."' /d. at 573 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968)). 
66. 446 U.S. 544, 573 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring), Chief Justice Berger and Justice Blackmun joined 
Justice Powell's opinion. /d. at 560 The concurring Justices agreed, however. with Justice Stewart's conclusion 
that the defendant voluntarily accompanied two otticers to the DEA office and consented to the search of her 
person and possessions. /d. 
67. /d. at 552 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
68. 446 u.s. 544, 554 (1980). 
69. /d. (emphasis added). 
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suspect was considered irrelevant "except insofar as that may have been 
conveyed to the [defendant]. " 70 By implication, Justice Stewart also rejected 
as irrelevant the subjective belief of the person confronted. 
Justice Stewart then turned to the circumstances that he thought would 
be relevant to the resolution of the question under the reasonable man stand-
ard. Although he did not purport to frame an exhaustive list, he did identify 
as indicative of a seizure (1) the threatening presence of several officers, 
(2) the display of weapons, (3) some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, and (4) the use oflanguage or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer's request might be compelled. 71 As support for his conclusion 
that no seizure had taken place in the concourse, Justice Stewart noted in 
Mendenhall that the agents had worn no uniforms and had displayed no 
weapons, they had not summoned the defendant to their presence but instead 
approached her, they had requested but did not demand to see identification 
and the ticket, and the events had taken place in a public concourse. 72 
According to Justice Stewart, this conclusion was unaffected even though the 
defendant had not been expressly told by the agents that she was free to 
decline to cooperate. 73 
Justice White's dissenting opinion on the seizure issue is devoted largely 
to Justice Stewart's willingness to deal with the issue when, at the district 
court level, the government had conceded that a seizure had occurred. 74 On 
the merits of the seizure issue, Justice White, while not disagreeing openly 
with Justice Stewart's premise that the question is what a reasonable person 
would have believed under the circumstances, argued that Justice Stewart 
ignored probative objective factors that clearly evinced a seizure-the of-
ficers had taken possession of the defendant's plane ticket and driver's 
license. Justice White proffered that it "is doubtful that any reasonable 
person about to board a plane would feel free to leave while law enforcement 
officers have her plane ticket. " 75 Justice White also asserted that Justice 
Stewart's attempted reconciliation of two other Supreme Court cases, both of 
which held that a seizure had occurred under the circumstances, did not 
contain an analysis of the extent to which a reasonable person would have 
thought he or she was free to leave. 76 It is unclear whether Justice White 
advanced this deficiency in Justice Stewart's opinion for purposes of demon-
strating that the "reasonable man" standard should not be controlling, or 
merely for purposes of demonstrating the analytical weakness of the Stewart 
opinion in Mendenhall. 
70. /d. at 554 n.6. 
71. /d. at 554. 
72. /d. at 555. 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 567-69 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that it was both necessary and appropriate 
for the Court to resolve the seizure issue because decisions by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
rested upon a "serious misapprehension" of federal law and because the resolution of that issue was "essential 
to the correct disposition of the other issues in the case." 446 U.S. 544, 551 n.5 (1980). 
75. /d. at 570 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). 
76. /d. at 570 n.5. 
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The two earlier Supreme Court cases that both Justices Stewart and 
White discussed in Mendenhall, while not particularly enlightening on the 
meaning of the concept of seizure, are worthy of brief mention. The first, 
Brown v. Texas, 71 was a paradigmatic stop and frisk case. In Brown cruising 
police officers observed the defendant in an alley walking away from another 
man in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed that 
the two men had been together or were about to meet when the patrol car 
appeared?8 The officers drove into the alley, got out, and asked the 
defendant to identify himself and explain what he was doing there. The defend-
ant refused and "angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop 
him.'' 79 The defendant then was frisked. When the defendant continued in his 
refusal to identify himself, he was arrested for the crime of failure to give 
name and address to an officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested 
the information. " 80 The Court in Brown held that "[w]hen the officers de-
tained [the defendant] for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, 
they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment." 81 Furthermore, "[N]one of the circumstances preced-
ing the officers' detention . . . justified a reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in criminal conduct"; therefore, since the stop was not lawful, the 
defendant could not be punished under the statute for refusing to identify 
himself. 82 
In Brown the Court did not attempt to identify precisely when the seizure 
had occurred, nor did the Court attempt to explain why, under the circum-
stances, it concluded that a seizure had occurred. Justice Stewart's opinion in 
Mendenhall, however, asserts that "[i]t could not have been plainer under the 
circumstances there presented [in Brown] that [the defendant] was forcibly 
detained by the officers. " 83 Justice Stewart's Mendenhall opinion also identi-
fies, by implication, when in the Brown case the encounter turned into a 
seizure. Justice Stewart described the encounter in Brown as follows: 
In that case, two police officers approached [the defendant] in an alley, and 
asked him to identify himself and to explain his reason for being there. [fhe 
defendant] "refused to identify himself and angrily asserted that the officers had 
no right to stop him" .... Up to this point there was no seizure. But after 
continuing to protest the officers' power to interrogate him, [the defendant] was 
77. 443 u.s. 47 (1979). 
78. /d. at 48. One officer also testified that h!l stopped the defendant because the situation "looked 
suspicious and [he] had never seen that subject in that area before." Id. at 49. 
79. /d. at 49. 
80. /d. Since the Court reversed on the ground that no reasonable suspicion existed for the initial stop, it 
did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the Texas "stop and identify" statute. /d. at 53 n.3. In 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), the Court again avoided resolution of the constitutional question 
presented by "stop and identify" statutes. In DeFillippo the Court assumed that such statutes were unconstitu-
tional, but held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a presumptively constitutional statute was legal for 
purposes of validating a search made incident to arrest. /d. at 3~. For a treatment of the problems presented 
by "stop and identify" statutes, see Stop and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solution to an 
Old Problem, 12 RUT. L.J. 585 (1981). 
8 I. 443 u.s. 47' 50 ( 1979). 
82. Id. at 51-52. 
83. 446 u.s. 544, 556 (1980). 
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first frisked, and then arrested. . . . The Court simply held in that case that 
because the officers had no reason to suspect [the defendant] of wrongdoing, 'there 
was no basis for detaining him . . . . 84 
Justice Stewart's Mendenhall opinion apparently concludes that in 
Brown the encounter became a seizure at the point of the frisk. As Justice 
White also correctly alleges in his Mendenhall dissent, the government did 
not contest the seizure question in Brown (thus accounting for the lack of 
specificity on the issue), but instead sought to justify the seizure on reason-
able suspicion grounds.85 Finally, Justice White was correct in his assertion 
that Justice Stewart made no attempt in Mendenhall to test the facts in Brown 
against the standard of what a reasonable man would have thought under the 
circumstances. 86 
The second seizure case discussed in Mendenhall by Justices Stewart 
and White was United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 87 In Brignoni-Ponce the 
Border Patrol stopped the defendant's vehicle near the Mexican border be-
cause the occupants appeared to be Mexican. The officers questioned the 
passengers about their citizenship and discovered that they were illegal 
aliens. 88 Nowhere in the Brignoni-Ponce opinion does the Court expressly 
declare that the act of stopping a moving vehicle constitutes a seizure. For 
fairly obvious reasons, everyone apparently assumed that it was a seizure. 
The Court simply held that a roving patrol of immigration officers can stop a 
vehicle in the general area of any international border whenever the officers 
reasonably suspect that the vehicle might contain illegal aliens. 89 Justice 
Stewart's view of the relevance of Brignoni-Ponce to the resolution of the 
Mendenhall case was that since a seizure in the context of the stop of a 
vehicle is materially more intrusive than a question put to a passing pedes-
trian, because it provides an opportunity for visual inspection of the vehicle 
not otherwise possible, considering a stop of an automobile as a seizure 
tells us very little about the constitutional status of encounters such as those 
that occurred in Brown or in Mendenhall itself.90 Justice White asserted in 
Mendenhall that this reasoning "confuse[d] the question of the quantum of 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify such seizures with the question 
whether a seizure occurred. " 91 Why Justice Stewart viewed the intrusive 
nature of an automobile stop as relevant to the question whether a seizure 
84. Id. 
85. ld. at 570 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 570. 
87. 422 u.s. 873 (1975). 
88. Id. at 875. In Brignoni·Ponce the Government contended that the officer's observations that the 
occupants were of Mexican descent by itself furnished reasonable suspicion that they were illegal aliens. The 
majority rejected this claim. Id. at 885-86. For a discussion of the particular problems associated with border 
stops, see Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than 
Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 57-62 (1981). 
89. 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 199-200. 
90. 446 u.s. 544, 556-57 (1980). 
91. Id. at 570 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
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occurs whenever an automobile is stopped, at least if the concept of seizure 
is viewed as turning on whether there has been a restriction of freedom of 
movement or action, is difficult, initially, to understand. On the other hand, if 
the concept of seizure implicates considerations other than simple physical 
restraints, then Justice Stewart's distinction is probative. Certainly, there is 
nothing inherent in the concept of seizure that would limit it to the question 
whether a restriction of movement or freedom of action had occurred. Seizure 
could be viewed, quite properly, as a more abstract concept that includes not 
only physical aspects (i.e., restraint on movement) but also intangible aspects 
in the nature of the right to avoid contact with government officials that would 
or might affect rights more commonly associated with rights of privacy. 
Justice Stewart, unfortunately, did not pursue this intriguing notion. 92 
We are left, therefore, with precedent from the Supreme Court that is not 
particularly helpful in resolving the question whether and when contact be-
tween a law enforcement official investigating criminal activity and a citizen 
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
A review of the numerous cases93 in the lower federal courts and in the 
state courts reveals, however, several recurring themes that appear relevant, 
at least facially, to the resolution of the seizure issue. From these cases one 
can identify the elements that, consistent with the general guidelines estab-
lished by the Supreme Court cases previously described, aid in the resolution 
of the question. These elements include the issues: first, from whose 
perspective to judge whether there has been a restriction of freedom of move-
ment;94 second, the appropriate method of evaluating the physical aspects of 
the encounter;95 third, the appropriate method of evaluating the verbal as-
pects of the encounter, 96 including the relevance of the police officer's failure 
to inform the citizen that he or she is free to ignore the officer's questions and 
walk away;97 fourth, the relevance of the use or display of force in the en-
counter;98 fifth, the relevance of police requests or commands to alter the 
location of the encounter;99 and sixth, the relevance of the intrusive nature of 
the encounter, including circumstances such as the nature of the questions 
asked, 100 the location of the encounter, 101 and any police requests or com-
92. For a discussion of this distinction in other cases, see infra text accompanying notes 240-44. 
93. See infra cases cited at notes 94-102. 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979); State v. Tsukiyama, 56 Hawaii 8, 525 P.2d 
1099 (1974). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); Ebarb v. State, 598 S. W.2d 842 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1980). 
%. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980); 
People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14,409 N.E.2d 958, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980). 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981). 
98. See, e.g., United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d378 
(9th Cir. 1974). 
99. See, e.g., United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilkerson v. United States,427 A.2d 
923 (D.C. 1981). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Robinson, 625-F.2d 
1211 (5th Cir. 1980). 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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mands for identification or other documents or for submission to a search of 
the person or of his or her possessions. 102 Under the general standard promul-
gated in Terry 103 these elements must be considered, when appropriate under 
the circumstances, in determining whether, by means of physical force or 
show of authority, a police officer has restrained a person's freedom of move-
ment. 
B. Objective v. Subjective Focus 
Courts must resolve the basic issue whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances in a police-citizen encounter, the citizen's freedom to walk 
away was restricted under the guise of official authority or whether the 
citizen's freedom of movement was limited only by his or her desire to co-
operate with the police. Absent either verbal commands from the officer 
specifically confirming that the person is not free to depart 104 or physical 
contact that interrupts movement or limits the ability of the person to depart 
from the scene, 105 the encounter most likely will produce differing conclusions 
on the ultimate question, depending upon the perspective from which one 
views the situation. One easily can envision a case in which the police officer 
does not intend to restrict an individual's freedom of movement, takes no 
action, and makes no statements that he intended or reasonably believed 
would convey the impression that the citizen's right to walk away was re-
stricted by official action, but one which, because of the surrounding circum-
stances of the encounter, the citizen reasonably believed was a forcible restric-
tion on his freedom of movement. In other words, many cases probably will 
arise in which the encounter was viewed and intended by the officer as an 
attempt to gain information from a citizen that depended entirely upon the 
citizen's willingness to cooperate, but one in which the citizen subjectively 
believed that he was not free to terminate by ignoring the officer and walking 
away. 
The reasonable man test, however, has been criticized. As previously 
mentioned, Professor LaFave has posited that a show of authority is implicit 
in the great bulk of cases in which a police officer approaches a person and 
seeks an explanation for his activities or some evidence of identification. 106 
Therefore, if the ultimate issue is whether a reasonable person would feel free 
to walk away, then virtually all police-citizen encounters would constitute 
seizures. 107 Professor LaFave argues, however, that the crucial question 
should not be whether a reasonable person would feel free to walk away-
realistically the answer would almost always be "no"-but whether as a 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 (5th 
Cir. 1980). 
!03. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
104. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39. 
105. See infra text accompanying notes 123-28. 
106. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
107. LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53, § 9.2(g), at 50. 
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matter of policy we should allow the police to rely on the moral and instinctive 
pressure to cooperate inherent in these encounters by not treating them as 
seizures. 108 Professor LaFave concludes that the answer should be "yes" 
provided the police officer did not add to the inherent pressure by engaging 
in menacing conduct significantly beyond that which is accepted in social 
intercourse. 109 
Justice Stewart, in Mendenhall, recognized that in many cases the resolu-
tion of the seizure issue could tum on the selection of a perspective from 
which to view the situation. Justice Stewart rejected an approach based on the 
subjective intent or belief of the officer or on the subjective belief of the 
defendant, and proffered instead a test of whether under the circumstances a 
"reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 110 
Justice Stewart's test was not novel and had been adopted in the lower 
courts 111 prior to Mendenhall and used by the Supreme Court in modified 
form to solve related problems. 112 
Under the objective reasonable man standard it would be irrelevant, for 
example, that the police officer did not intend to restrict the person's ability to 
walk away if his conduct or verbal assertions would convey a different im-
pression to a reasonable man; apparently it also would be irrelevant that the 
officer intended to seize the person if neither his conduct nor his verbal 
assertions would convey that impression to a reasonable man. 113 Also irrele-
vant would be the assertion that the defendant was a timid, authority-con-
scious person who would submit willingly to the slightest suggestion of 
authority, or that he or she was a contentious, antiauthoritarian figure willing to 
test the outer limits of the exercise of official discretion. 
Several courts also have suggested, in a slightly different context, that the 
objective reasonable man standard should be refined to embody the notion of 
108. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
140-41 (1981). Professor LaFave argues that the "moral and instinctive pressures" to cooperate with a police 
officer "are in general sound and may he relied on by the police." LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(g), 
at 53. 
109. LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(g), at 53. Professor LaFave posits that the critical inquiry 
under this approach would be whether the police officer initiating the encounter "conducted himself in a manner 
consistent with what would he viewed as a nonoffensive contact if it occcurred between two ordinary citizens." 
Id. Using the LaFave analysis, even physical contact would be acceptable if it was of the type that constitutes a 
normal means of attracting attention./d. at 54. Courts are divided on the appropriateness of the use of LaFave's 
analysis. See United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 1981) ("offensive" statement by the officer did 
not by itself render the encounter a seizure). See also infra text accompanying notes 171-73. Compare Login v. 
State, 394 So. 2d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), with United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 
1978). 
110. 446 u.s. 544, 554 (1980). 
Ill. See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,58 
(2d Cir. 1977); State v. Tsukiyama, 56 Hawaii 8, 525 P.2d 1099 (1974). 
I 12. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court held that for purposes of determining 
whether an individual had been "interrogated," as that concept is relevant under the holding in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the subjective intent of the police, while relevant, would not be controlling. 446 
u.s. 291, 301-02 (1980). 
113. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980); United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 
44 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought under the 
circumstances. 114 Although no definite explanation of this psychological 
modification has been proffered, the suggestion apparently considers a guilty 
suspect as more likely to perceive an encounter with a police officer as the 
first step leading to arrest and prosecution (a seizure). An innocent person, on 
the other hand, having nothing to hide, presumably would not immediately 
jump to the conclusion that an encounter with a police officer is always a 
restriction on his right to walk away at will. Whether this modification is 
inconsistent with Justice Stewart's Mendenhall opinion is unclear. 
The objective reasonable man standard has several obvious advantages. 
First, it eliminates the prospect that the test itself will ordain the outcome. A 
test based upon the subjective belief or intent of the officer or on the subjec-
tive belief of the defendant probably will produce the testimony that the 
subjective belief or intent was present at the time. 115 Second, the objective 
reasonable man standard allows courts to develop standards of conduct to 
guide the activities of law enforcement officials, thus eliminating the necessity 
of requiring police officers to make ad hoc judgments concerning the nuances 
of their words or behavior or of the psychological makeup of the person with 
whom they are dealing. 116 
The problems with a wholly objective reasonable man standard are 
obvious. If an individual subjectively believes that he or she has been de-
prived of his or her freedom of movement under the guise of official authority 
and submits, the deprivation is complete. The loss of the right to walk away is 
irreversible once the freedom to walk away has been forfeited (albeit mis-
takenly), and an individual gains little personal satisfaction by a judicial dec-
laration thereafter that the right never actually was given up. The use of the 
objective reasonable man standard, therefore, arises from judicial recognition 
that the fourth amendment is designed principally to control or limit official 
discretion-a regulatory model-to keep us collectively secure, rather than to 
protect particular individuals against the loss of rights that thereby are guar-
anteed. 117 That an individual has lost something because of official activity is 
not as important as "whether the government has engaged in activity which if 
left unregulated would pose a threat to the security of people generally." 118 
114. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753,155 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d497, 500 
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); 
United States v. Medina-Pena, 520 F. Supp. 227, 230 (S.D. Texas 1981). 
115. LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(g), at 52.. . 
116. Id. As Professor LaFave has noted, however, the use of a reasonable person standard does not solve 
the problem. He argues that an average person most likely will feel obliged to stop and respond to any inquirY by 
a police officer. Thus, an honest use of the reasonable person standard should result in a finding that a seizure 
occurred in most cases. Professor LaFave further asserts that we also must be prepared, therefore, to accept the 
notion that the "moral and instinctive" pressures to cooperate will not, in themselves, warrant a fmding that a 
seizure occurred. See supra notes 10~. 
117. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974). 
118. Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. 
REV. 493, 496-97 (1980). 
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C. Use of Physical Force or Show of Authority 
While the ultimate question remains whether the individual's freedom of 
movement has been restrained Gudged by the reasonable man standard), 
Terry 119 also clearly requires that the restriction flow from a police officer's 
show of authority or use of physical force. 120 This requirement necessarily 
demands the evaluation of the elements discussed earlier. 121 In some in-
stances the activities of the officers, whether physical or verbal, are clear and 
unambiguous; in other instances the conclusion to be drawn under the reason-
able man standard requires the exercise of refined judgment and also may 
necessitate consideration of such subtle factors as the tone of the officer's 
voice. 122 
I. Use of Physical Force to Obstruct Freedom of Movement 
Clearly, any physical activity by the police that interrupts or impedes a 
suspect's locomotion should weigh heavily in favor of finding a seizure. 
Impeding the flow of automobile traffic by means of a roadblock 123 or stop-
ping a single automobile through a show of authority, such as a police cruiser 
with the siren on, 124 is conduct typical of this category. In the street encounter 
situation, physically restraining movement through bodily contact, such as a 
hand on the shoulder or arm, or otherwise physically obstructing movement, 
such as bodily blocking the path of a walking or running suspect, like-
wise should weigh heavily in favor of finding a seizure. 125 Since the test for a 
seizure depends ultimately on the finding of a restriction of freedom of move-
ment or action (i.e., the right to disengage and walk away), any physical 
action by the officer that impedes freedom of movement, or that could be 
interpreted reasonably as doing so, 126 apparently would present the para-
digmatic seizure. If an in-motion suspect has been restrained physically, a 
119. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
120. /d. at 19 n.I6. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102. 
122. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554 (1980); United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892,896 (5th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. !979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1980). 
123. See State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N. W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980). Although a roadblock may constitute a seizure, 
the reasonableness of the seizure may be established by circumstances other than an objective and particu-
larized basis for believing that criminal activity is afoot. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976). See LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.5, at 140-45. 
124. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. I, 4 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (dictum); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 662(1979); Henry v. UnitedStates,361 U.S. 98, 99(1959);Sharpev. UnitedStates,660F.2d967,968(4thCir. 
1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, 516 
F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1975). 
125. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ( .. Examples of circumstances that might 
indicate a seizure ... would be ••• some physical touching .... "); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 
532 (5th Cir. 1980) (blocking the path of the suspect walking through an airport concourse). But see State v. 
Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 883 (1981) (mere tap on shoulder at outset to get the 
defendant's attention not enough to turn contact into a seizure). 
126. Physical activities by police officers that reasonably could be interpreted as limiting freedom of 
movement include taking possession of personal property belonging to the suspect. United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544,570 n.3 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d I 151, 1155 (5th Cir. 
1980). See infra text accompanying notes 148-49. 
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fortiori his freedom to walk away has been restricted even if only for the short 
period a police officer would need to explain that he did not intend to impede 
the suspect's freedom and that if the suspect was not willing to cooperate, he 
or she was free to move on. 
A seizure may occur even in the absence of a finding that physical bar-
riers or other actions of a police officer had interrupted an in-motion suspect's 
freedom of movement. 127 A person has been seized when he or she has been 
denied the right to disengage, that is, to walk away, and this view of seizure 
does not require the physical obstruction of an in-motion suspect or the 
physical obstruction of a suspect who is attempting to disengage. If physical 
barriers are imposed, such as a police cruiser blocking the natural path of the 
suspect's automobile or several police officers surrounding a stationary sus-
pect, the situation should not be viewed as materially different from blocking 
the movement of an in-motion suspect or of one who is attempting to dis-
engage.128 
2. Show of Authority 
Physical obstruction of a suspect's freedom of movement, however, is 
not the sine qua non of a seizure. The Supreme Court also has indicated that a 
seizure may occur when the deprivation results from a show of authority. 129 
This component of the test is much more difficult to quantify, but obviously is 
designed to reflect the notion that freedom of movement may be restricted by 
conduct other than physical restraint. A show of authority would include any 
conduct by the police, whether verbal or otherwise, that would indicate to a 
reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the officer and walk 
away. 
A show of authority can be manifested in a variety of ways. The physical 
manifestation of a show of authority would include, for example, the display 
of weapons 130 or other conduct that makes it impracticable for the suspect to 
leave. 131 Clearly, in terms of the response of a reasonable person, an en-
counter with a law enforcement officer displaying the force of arms should be 
a compelling, if not a controlling, factor in favor of finding that a seizure has 
occurred. 132 When an officer approaches a suspect with guns drawn or in a 
manner which makes it clear (to a reasonable person) that force will be used at 
127. Ebarb v. State, 598 S.W.2d 842, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("A 'stop' has no more to do with a 
person's prior motionlessness than a 'frisk' has to do with his prior friskiness."). 
128. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 
1980); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 728 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) ("A stop within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment does not mean a physical stop, but rather a 'restraint' of movement."). 
129. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968). 
130. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
131. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36. 
132. In most cases in which a display of force has been used during a police-citizen encounter, the courts 
have assumed that a seizure has occurred and the only question remaining is whether the seizure was a stop or a 
full-scale arrest. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51. See generally United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 
34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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the slightest provocation (for example, an officer with his hand on a holstered 
firearm), the paradigmatic show of authority exists. 
A second class of cases in which the physical activities of the police 
would indicate a show of authority constituting a restriction of freedom of 
movement would be those in which the encounter includes a frisk of the 
suspect. 133 The Terry case 134 represents a classic illustration of this point. In 
Terry no independent and significant physical disruption of the defendant's 
freedom of movement occurred; instead the facts included an approach, a 
few questions asked, mumbled responses, and the physical act of grabbing the 
defendant, spinning him around, and patting down the outside of his cloth-
ing. 135 In Terry the record was barren of sufficient facts for the Court to 
determine whether a seizure occurred for the purpose of conducting the frisk 
prior to the physical contact, but the Court in Terry clearly held that once the 
frisk occurred a seizure resulted. 136 In other words, the physical actions of the 
police in frisking a suspect, even if unaccompanied by other manifestations of 
physical restraint or words indicating that the suspect was not free to leave, 
should be viewed as a show of authority sufficient to indicate a restraint on 
freedom of movement. A person subjected to a frisk could not reasonably 
conclude that, once the officer has commenced the act of frisking, an attempt 
to disengage would be permitted before the frisk was complete. 
The verbal actions of the officers frequently will control the show of 
authority component of the test. Commands to a suspect, such as "Stay where 
you are!'' or "Don't move!," express a clear message to the suspect that he or 
she is not free to disengage and should be viewed as indicative of a seizure. 137 
On the other hand, apart from the verbal command that clearly manifests a 
deprivation of freedom under the guise of lawful authority, the verbal activi-
ties of the police officer are likely to be more ambiguous. Lower courts have 
recognized, and Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenha/l 138 agrees, that an 
evaluation of a police officer's verbal communications may require the con-
sideration of such subtle concerns as the tone of the officer's voice. 139 This 
view, of course, represents a recognition that the show of authority which 
would be sufficient to convey to a reasonable person the impression that he or 
she was not free to leave must include circumstances other than express 
verbal commands or statements that the suspect is not free to leave, physical 
conduct conveying that impression, such as the display of firearms or the 
frisking of the suspect, and outright physical obstruction of locomotion or 
!33. Brown v. Texas,443 U.S.47,49(1979);Terryv. Ohio,392 U.S. I, 19(1968).Seesupratextaccompany-
ing notes 48 & 84. 
134. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
135. /d. at 19. 
136. /d. 
137. People v. Tebedo, 81 Mich. App. 535,265 N.W.2d 406 (1978); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14,409 
N.E.2d 958, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980). 
138. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
139. See supra note 122. 
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attempted locomotion. These circumstances, which include most commonly 
an evaluation of the verbal activities of the police, do, indeed, require the 
exercise of a refined judgment and confirm that the Court was correct when it 
described such encounters as "rich in diversity." 140 Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to isolate relevant elements and to examine their import in terms of how 
they might be viewed by a reasonable person. These elements would include 
such diverse circumstances as the location of the encounter, the length of the 
encounter, the words used to effectuate the initial encounter, the nature of the 
questions asked, the existence of any police requests for documents or for 
moving the encounter to a more convenient location, police requests for 
consent to a search of the suspect's person or property, and the absence of 
explicit statements from the officer that the suspect is free to ignore the 
officer's inquiry and walk away. In all likelihood, no single element would be 
controlling. 
The location of the encounter, for example, may be relevant in the total-
ity of the circumstances. Police-citizen encounters that take place in public 
areas should be viewed more reasonably as fortuitous and unrelated to the 
investigation of specific crime. Therefore, such encounters are less likely to 
be reasonably viewed as a show of authority that restricts freedom of move-
ment. 141 When the encounter moves out of the domain of public or quasi-
public property, and into areas normally not frequented by the public, 142 the 
reasonable conclusion would be that the officer initiating a contact was pre-
pared to deny the suspect the right to disengage. Thus, police-citizen en-
counters initiated when an officer seeks out a particular suspect in his home or 
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 13 (1968). 
141. Apart from the paradigmatic street encounter between police officer and citizen, airport surveillance 
programs have produced the largest number of litigated claims. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Harrison, 667 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 
(5th Cir. 1981); Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1079 (1981). 
Encounters that occur on public streets or in areas that the public is free to traverse, such as airport 
facilities, are the subject of routine patrol by law enforcement officials, and it may be assumed that the public is 
aware of this fact. An encounter with a law enforcement official in the public domain, therefore, is not an 
unusual occurrence. 
The Supreme Court adopted a similar rationale in upholding the fixed checkpoint stop conducted close by 
the border to detect illegal aliens. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court contrasted 
the impact of fixed checkpoints with those of roving patrols: 
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interfer-
ence with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they 
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints ...• Second, checkpoint opera-
tions both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity .... [f]he stops 
should not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature. 
ld. at 559-60 (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying note 222. A similar view was expressed in 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979), which produced the following observation from Justice 
Rehnquist: "Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be 'frightened' or 'annoyed' when 
stopped en masse, [the Court adopts a different standard] .... The Court thus elevates the adage 'misery loves 
company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." !d. at 664 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
142. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (encounter in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug 
trafficking). 
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automobile 143 for purposes of investigation or questioning should be viewed 
more reasonably as entailing a show of official authority that implicitly con-
veys an intent to restrict freedom of movement. 
The method by which the police officer initiates the encounter clearly is 
also important. Apart from the relevance of a display of firearms in initiating 
the contact, common sense dictates that a review must include questions such 
as whether the officer requested the cooperation of the citizen or whether, 
instead, he commenced the encounter with a command. The difference be-
tween an encounter that begins with an officer's statement, "Sir, may I talk to 
you a moment?" 144 and one that commences with a police officer's command, 
such as, "Freeze! Don't move!" or "Stay where you are!" 145 is the difference 
between a police-citizen encounter that seeks the voluntary cooperation of 
the citizen and one that easily could contain a show of authority carrying the 
implicit message that the citizen was not free to ignore the command and walk 
away. 
The nature of the questions asked by an officer during an encounter also 
may be relevant to the seizure issue. As questioning moves from general 
questioning concerning facts unrelated to a particular crime or class of crimes 
to questions indicating the officer's interest in a specific crime or class of 
crimes, 146 the perception of the citizen reasonably may change from one of a 
voluntary encounter, from which he is free to disengage, to one of a formal 
police investigation of specific criminal activity, which he is not free to ignore. 
Directly related to the relevance of the substance of the inquiry is the rele-
vance of its length. When a police officer prolongs an encounter by asking 
additional questions or seeking and examining documents or property, 147 the 
143. See United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant confronted in the doorway of his 
home by officers with guns drawn); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979) (officers pulled alongside 
defendant's parked vehicle). 
144. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978). See also 
United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 845 (D.C. 1972) ("Hold it, sir, could I speak with you a second?"). 
145. People v. Tebedo, 81 Mich. App. 535,265 N.W.2d 406 (1978); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14,409 
N.E.2d 958, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980). 
146. See United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 (9th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 12Il (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Blum, 614 F.2d 537 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
In Setzer the defendant was confronted in the Miami airport by the DEA agent, Paul J. Markonni. One 
commentator has noted that at least 37 reported appellate decisions concern the activities of Agent Markonni. 
See Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and-Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Prob· 
able Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 53 n.25 (1981). After Markonni identified himself, he asked the 
defendant to consent to a body search. When the defendant refused, Markonni asked the defendant why he 
refused if he was not "carrying." 654 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1981). The court found this conduct "disturbing" 
since it implied that a person who is not engaged in criminal activity should be willing to surrender constitutional 
rights. /d. at 357. The court further held, however, that such "offensive" conduct by law enforcement officials, 
standing alone, did not render the encounter unconstitutionally "intrusive." I d. at 358. 
In Robinson, another case that concerned Agent Markonni, the defendant was informed that the agent "had 
reason to believe" the defendant was "carrying." 625 F.2d 12Il, 1216 (5th Cir. 1980). The court held that a 
specific accusation would be a significant circumstance. /d. at 1217. 
147. See United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1981). Patino represents a paradigmatic 
voluntary encounter that quickly escalated into a seizure because of the intrusive activities of the law enforce-
ment officials. Following police initiation of the encounter in an airport terminal, which included a display of 
identification by the officers and an earlier visual examination of her suitcase, which had been checked, 
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encounter begins to resemble, and reasonably could be perceived as, a formal 
investigation with the attendant implication that the citizen is not free to 
terminate it at will. In this connection, examination of the impact of police 
requests for documents or for permission to search the person or property of 
the citizen is instructive. Just as the nature and length of the questioning are 
relevant to how a reasonable person would view an encounter, so too are any 
officer requests for access to documents 148 (driver's license, airline tickets, 
and so on) or for the right to search the person or property of the subject. 149 
One must acknowledge the practical consideration that the suspect rarely will 
want to leave when police have possession of his or her property. The premise 
that leads to this conclusion, however, comes from the idea that as the en-
counter becomes more intrusive, even though the inquiries are framed in 
terms of requests rather than commands and the situation otherwise is still 
ambiguous, the more likely and reasonable is the perception that the officer is 
engaged in an official investigation of a specific crime or class of crimes that 
has focused on the citizen. Thus, since the inquiries constitute a formal inves-
tigation rather than routine questioning, it is more likely and reasonable for 
the citizen to conclude that any attempt to ignore the requests or disengage 
will be met with force. 
Finally, police requests or directions to move the location of the initial 
encounter to a more cbnvenient place also are relevant to the seizure issue. 
Clearly, an order or command by the officer for the citizen to move, such as a 
command to take a seat in the squad car, is a show of authority that, although 
expressed in affirmative terms-"move somewhere"-carries with it the 
necessary implication that a failure to move, let alone an attempt to walk 
away, will be met with force. 150 A police request to alter the location of the 
defendant was asked if she would mind showing her ticket and some identification. The agents informed her 
early in the conversation that she fit the drug courier profile. She produced identification with the name "Dora 
Patino." Her airline ticket bore the name "Gloria Restrepo." In justifying the discrepancy, the defendant said 
that her cousin had made the reservation. The agents explained the problems of drug trafficking in the .Miami 
airport and asked permission to search her handbag. The defendant gave consent and opened the bag. After 
finding nothing in the handbag, the agents requested consent to search her suitcase. When she asked the reason 
for the search, she was told that they were looking for narcotics and that she did not have to consent. Defendant 
refused to allow the search. At that point one of the officers left to summon a narcotics-detecting dog. Question-
ing continued and the defendant finally was permitted to depart. The agents then went to the baggage area where 
they arranged a "suitcase lineup." The dog showed little interest in the bag, and the luggage was released. Next, 
the officers obtained the call-back number for the Restrepo ticket, phoned that number and were told that no one 
named Restrepo lived there. They then contacted officials in the San Francisco airport, the defendant's destina-
tion, and gave those officials the information they had obtained. When the defendant landed she was detained, 
and her suitcase again was examined by a narcotics-detecting dog. The dog gave a positive response. The 
defendant finally consented to a search of the bag, and cocaine was discovered. !d. at 725-26. The Court held 
that a seizure had occurred when she was first stopped and asked for her ticket and identification. !d. at 727-'l!J. 
148. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980). 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d354(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d47!J(5th 
Cir. 1980). 
150. In most cases in which an order or command to change the location of an encounter has been given, 
the courts have assumed that a seizure has occurred. The only question remaining is whether the seizure 
constituted a stop or an arrest. United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Nieves, 
609 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Figueroa v. United States, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980); United States 
v. Esposito, 484 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N. Y. 1980); United States v. Patino-Zambrano, 482 F. Supp. 245 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979). See infra text accompanying notes 213-18. 
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encounter makes the situation more ambiguous. 151 The question whether a 
seizure has occurred must be answered by considering the perception that 
such a request is likely to produce in the mind of a reasonable person. If the 
police request clearly is linked to the investigation of specific criminal activity 
and that fact is known to the citizen, or if the request is to move the encounter 
to a police-dominated environment, the action is likely to be viewed as imply-
ing that refusal to comply will not be accepted. Thus, a reasonable person 
probably would perceive requests that he or she return to the scene of a crime 
so that he or she can be viewed by the victim, 152 or requests that he or she 
come to the station house or field office for questioning, 153 as commands 
masked in polite terms. On the other hand, a citizen is less likely to perceive 
as menacing or threatening requests to move the location of the encounter for 
the obvious convenience of others (for example, to avoid blocking a sidewalk) 
or requests to move that constitute only de minimus intrusions. 154 
3. Absence of Warnings 
Even if the words of the officer initiating the encounter are polite-they 
clearly convey the impression that the officer is seeking the individual's vol-
untary cooperation rather than demanding a response to inquiries-questions 
have been raised about the relevance of the lack of an explicit warning that the 
individual does not have to respond or cooperate and is free to ignore the 
request and walk away. The nearly universal response from courts has been 
that an affirmative warning is not required each time law enforcement officials 
seek the cooperation of a citizen. 155 Moreover, the absence of such a warning 
apparently creates no adverse inference and adds nothing to the argument 
that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have viewed the 
encounter as one that he or she was not free to avoid at will. Courts frequently 
cite Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 156 and Miranda v. Arizona 157 as interpreted 
in Oregon v. Mathiason, 158 to support the conclusion that warnings are not 
15 I. The airport search cases, such as Mendenhall, nonnally concern a "request" to alter the location of 
the encounter. See generally United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hill, 626 
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980). 
152. See United States v. Short, 570 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd, 
614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Wilkerson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923 (D.C. 
1981); Commonwealth v. Lovette, 271 Pa. Super. 250, 413 A.2d 390 (1979). 
153. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (per curiam)(officer asked if the defendant could 
"meet him at the state patrol office"). 
154. Whether a police request to relocate an encounter for the obvious convenience of others is menacing 
or threatening depends, of course, on whether the reason for the request is either clear to the suspect or 
explained to him. By far the most common order to move occurs when an automobile is stopped and the officer 
orders the suspect out of the vehicle. The Supreme Court has approved the practice of ordering persons who 
have been stopped for traffic violations to alight from the vehicle without the necessity of showing a separate 
justification for the order. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 223-24. 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). Bu! see 
Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1079 (1981). 
156. 412 u.s. 218 (1973). 
157. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
158. 429 U.S. 492 ( 1977) (per curiam). 
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required. 159 Schneckloth, Miranda, and Mathiason, of course, deal generally 
with the question whether an explicit warning of the content of the constitu-
tional rights concerned must be given prior to obtaining a valid waiver there-
of. Schneckloth held that an explicit warning that an individual has a constitu-
tional right to refuse consent to a search is not required to find that the person 
freely and voluntarily gave consent. 160 Mathiason, interpreting Miranda, 
made it clear that the Miranda warnings of the right to remain silent and the 
right to counsel need not be given to everyone questioned by the police. 161 
Initially, Schneckloth and Mathiason appear to foreclose the argument that 
the individual has a right, when confronted by police officers seeking his or 
her cooperation, to be told that he or she is free to ignore the requests and 
walk away. Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that these cases do 
not directly preclude the argument that some form of warning should be 
given. 
When a citizen has been confronted by law enforcement officers seeking 
information, courts tend to view the issue presented as a choice between two 
possible results: either the person was seized (determined by what a reason-
able person would think under the circumstances), or the person was not 
seized and his or her failure to ignore the officers' questions and walk away 
arose from a desire (albeit perhaps unconscious) to cooperate. If the circum-
stances of the encounter demonstrate that no seizure occurred, then the 
person's continued cooperation (answering questions, producing documents, 
or remaining in the presence of the investigating officers) is considered a form 
of consent to the activity or the waiver of a constitutional right. But does the 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
160. 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). In Schneckloth the defendant was a passenger in an automobile stopped 
for a routine traffic infraction. When the driver was unable to produce a license, the officer asked one of the 
occupants, Joe Alcola, who had indicated earlier that the automobile belonged to his brother, if he could search 
the car. Alcola replied, "Sure, go ahead." The officer opened the trunk and found stolen checks, which were 
admitted in evidence at Bustamante's trial. ld. at 22. The Court held that the validity of Alcola's consent to 
search was to be determined by whether that consent was "voluntarily" given, and in making the determination 
proof that the person giving consent knew he or she had the right to refuse is simply one circumstance to be 
taken into account. I d. at 226-27. Specifically, the Court held that the government need not advise the person 
that he or she has the right to refuse consent before eliciting that consent. I d. at 23 I. 
161. 429 U.S. 492, 495 ( 1977). Miranda held that warnings must be given prior to "custodial interrogation." 
Miranda v.-Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). Custodial interrogation was defined as "questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officials after a person has been taken into custody or othenvise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way." ld. (emphasis added). In Mathiason the defendant voluntarily met with police 
officers, at their request, at police headquarters. The defendant was told that he was not under arrest, but the 
Miranda warnings were not given. He then was questioned about his possible involvement in a burglary under 
investigation. 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977). The Supreme Court of Oregon suppressed the defendant's statements 
because it found that the questioning had been conducted in a "coercive atmosphere," a circumstance that, it 
held, triggered the need for Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Oregon v. Mathiason, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (Or. 
1976). The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant was not in custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; hence, Miranda was inapplicable. 429 U.S. 492, 495 
(1977). See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (warnings need not be given simply because the 
focus of the investigation may have been on the suspect questioned). But see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 
(1969) (warnings must be given to a person questioned in his own home after arrest); Mathis v. United States, 
391 U.S. I ( 1968) (warnings must be given to a prison inmate questioned about involvement in a separate 
offense). 
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resolution of the seizure issue entail the same fundamental concerns as those 
that were before the Court in Schneckloth, so that the rationale of that case 
can be applied properly? In one sense, of course, the analogy is defensible. 
The individual has a constitutional right to control his or her freedom of 
movement, and included within that right is the right, when confronted by law 
enforcement officers seeking information, to ignore the request and walk 
away. 162 If the individual accedes to these requests for information, the 
person has consented to be in the presence of the officers and thereby has 
waived the right to walk away. By the same token, when the police request 
permission to search an individual or his or her property, that person has the 
right to refuse consent. If he or she agrees to allow the officer to conduct the 
search, the person has consented and thereby has waived a constitutional 
right. Schneckloth held that the validity of the consent (the waiver) did not 
turn on proof that the individual knew he or she had the right to refuse 
permission to search; 163 that is, Schneckloth held that no constitutional re-
quirement exists, in the form of a prerequisite to finding a valid waiver of 
fourth amendment rights, that the person be informed that he or she has a 
right to refuse consent. 164 
In another sense, however, the reasoning in Schneckloth is inapposite 
when applied to situations containing alleged waivers in police-citizen en-
counters. In most of these cases the question is whether, under all the cir-
cumstances, a seizure occurred. Because the situation normally is ambiguous, 
the question is resolved by determining how a reasonable person would view 
the encounter; that is, the issue is whether a reasonable person would have 
believed, under the circumstances, that he or she was not free to leave or to 
ignore the requests made by law enforcement officers. The issue is not what 
the individual subjectively believed or intended; under the prevailing test, 
subjective belief that he or she was not free to leave is irrelevant. 165 The 
question presented in the seizure cases is whether the person actually con-
sented to the encounter, determined on the basis of what a reasonable person 
would have thought, and not whether the consent was free and voluntary 
(valid consent), which was the question in Schneckloth. The conclusion that 
the person consented to the encounter is merely a finding that necessarily is 
reached when a court determines, applying the reasonable person test, that 
the police officers did not deprive the individual of his or her liberty or 
freedom of movement. A statement that the person was free to leave clearly 
would be relevant to the resolution of this question. While it may not be 
necessary, to secure a free and voluntary (valid) consent, to warn the person 
that he or she is free to ignore an inquiry, it is quite another matter to say that 
such a warning is not appropriate when the question is whether the actions of 
162. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
163. See supra text accompanying note 160. 
164. /d. 
165. See supra text accompanying notes 110--14. 
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the police, viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person, constituted a 
deprivation of freedom of movement-that is, whether the person actually 
consented to the encounter. To impose such a requirement would not be 
inconsistent with Schneckloth and would go a long way toward achieving a 
workable and definite standard to resolve what is otherwise a very difficult 
factual question. 
The relevance of Miranda and Mathiason to the resolution of the seizure 
question also is questionable. Miranda and its progeny hold that an individual 
in custody (a person deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant 
way 166) must be warned of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel 
prior to police questioning. If the person is not in custody, no warning of the 
right to remain silent need be given. 167 When a police officer initiates an 
encounter with a citizen that includes requests for information, the Miranda 
warning need not be given if the person is not in custody or otherwise de-
prived of his or her freedom of movement in a significant way. 168 Miranda, of 
course, is based on the premise that the inherently compelling nature of 
custodial interrogation requires a specific warning to the individual to ensure 
that the constitutional right to remain silent is safeguarded properly. 169 In the 
absence of custody no similar warning is required, since the compelling cir-
cumstances are not present. To argue that Miranda warnings need not be 
given in every police-citizen encounter because, in the absence of custody, 
the compulsion to speak is not present, does not, however, respond to the 
question whether a seizure occurred. When the issue is whether, under the 
circumstances, a seizure occurred, a relevant question would be whether the 
person was told that he or she did not need to respond. Miranda warnings 
were designed to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation 
situations; just because the factual predicate (custody) is lacking does not 
mean that a similar warning should not be given, for entirely different reasons, 
to aid in the resolution of an entirely different problem. Miranda determines 
the lawful use of statements obtained by determining whether or not the 
person was in custody, but neither the holding nor the logic of Miranda helps 
resolve the fourth amendment issue of whether, under the circumstances, a 
seizure occurred. 
Admittedly, the reasoning of Miranda is not related directly to the resolu-
tion of the seizure issue. Furthermore, Miranda does not require warnings of 
the right to remain silent in every police-citizen encounter for the defendant's 
statements to be admissible. To impose such a requirement to clarify the 
intent of the police (and, hence, the perception of a reasonable person), how-
ever, would not be inconsistent with Miranda. A warning requirement would 
help to resolve the ambiguity in most police-citizen encounters concerning 
166. See supra note 161. 
167. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 
168. !d. at 478-79. 
169. !d. at 457-58. 
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whether the person is free to ignore the requests for information (the seizure 
issue). 
The position that warnings, whether in the form of the right to remain 
silent or of a more general warning that the person is free to walk away, are 
not required in every police-citizen encounter is supported by the holdings in 
Schneckloth and Miranda. The circumstances and constitutional concerns 
that produced those decisions, however, are distinguishable. Thus, to hold 
that some form of warning is required whenever the police seek the coopera-
tion of an individual suspected of criminal activity is not inconsistent with 
either case. The justification for warnings would not be that they were re-
quired to make the waiver free and voluntary or to dissipate the compelling 
nature of the environment. Instead, the requirement of warnings would be 
justified on the grounds that warnings would make the seizure issue easier to 
resolve and that they would protect more adequately the fourth amendment 
rights. The latter justification is based upon the premise proffered by Profes-
sor LaFave that in most police-citizen encounters it is simply unrealistic to 
assume that individuals will believe that they are free to ignore an officer's 
requests and walk away. 170 
The conclusion should be obvious that no single, definite standard exists 
by which to evaluate when a police-citizen encounter becomes a seizure, 
especially when neither actual force (including a show of arms) nor physical 
obstruction occurs. Professor LaFave undoubtedly is correct when he argues 
that a realistic appraisal of the probable response of an individual who is 
confronted by law enforcement officials seeking information always will be 
that he or she is not free to ignore the officers and walk away. Professor 
LaFave has suggested, therefore, that the focus should be on whether the 
conduct of the officers went beyond that which normally is acceptable in 
social intercourse among individuals. This standard should be determined by 
considering the "menacing" nature of the officer's conduct or words. 171 It is 
unclear what Professor LaFave had in mind by the choice of the word 
"menacing" to describe the limit on an officer's authority to seek the volun-
tary cooperation of citizens. 172 If he intended that the word connote a rude or 
threatening activity, in which the citizen would be offended or reasonably 
might anticipate physical harm or the use of physical force, the standard is 
misguided. Why social amenities should govern fourth amendment standards 
is difficult to understand; and clearly a seizure can occur without the use or 
170. See supra text accompanying note 53. See also Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and 
Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 76 (1981) 
("(\V]aming[s] would not only help to ensure the voluntariness of consent but would also help streamline the 
evidentiary problems inherent in its proof."). 
171. LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(g), at 53-54. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109. 
172. Professor LaFave suggests that the "critical inquiry would be whether the policeman, although 
perhaps making inquiries which a private citizen would not be expected to make, has otherwise conducted 
himself in a manner consistent with what would be viewed as a nonoffensive contact if it occurred between two 
ordinary citizens." LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(g), at 53. 
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threat of force. 173 If, however, Professor LaFave used the word "menacing" 
to describe activities which indicate that the encounter is simply the first step 
toward arrest and prosecution-threatening the full force of the law-then it is 
much closer to the mark. In the absence of actual physical restraints or 
unequivocal verbal commands, a reasonable person examining the conduct of 
the officer is more likely to view the circumstances as a seizure when the 
conduct or verbal activities of the police become intrusive, that is, when they 
clearly are related to the investigation of specific criminal acts. It is the threat 
of arrest and prosecution that produces the perception of restricted liberty in a 
police-citizen encounter, and that perception is more likely to arise when 
conduct of the police is linked to the investigation of specific criminal activity. 
Ill. THE CONCEPTS OF "STOP" AND "ARREsT" 
The dimensions of the constitutional term "seizure," as noted in the 
introduction, are greater than a simple definition of the circumstances that 
constitute a seizure and those that do not. The Supreme Court has developed 
a two-tier analysis of fourth amendment protections, which provides that the 
legality of a seizure will be evaluated (at least in part) to determine its reason-
ableness under the circumstances 174 by balancing the intrusiveness of the 
activity against the legitimacy or compelling nature of the law enforcement 
interest at stake. The Court has sanctioned the use of the terms "stop" and 
"arrest" to describe the two categories of seizure. 175 
The previous section discussed the proper method of dealing with the 
question whether a seizure had occurred. Assuming that the answer to that 
question is affirmative in a given case, another equally difficult question must 
be resolved: Was the seizure a "stop" or an "arrest"? By definition, all stops 
and all arrests are seizures, and, therefore, they must be justified by some level 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 129-40. 
174. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968), genernlly is thought to be the first case in which the Court authorized 
a seizure on less than probable cause based upon a weighing of the interest in effective law enforcement against 
the intrusion on personal liberty. Terry upheld the reasonableness of the encounter by "balancing the need to 
search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Id. at 21. Terry, however, was 
concerned primarily with the right of the officer to conduct a limited search (frisk) of a person suspected of 
criminal activity, and the Court merely assumed, without necessarily deciding, that the fourth amendment does 
not prohibit forcible stops based upon reasonable suspicion. !d. at 32-33 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Court made explicit what was implicit in Terry; "A brief 
stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while 
obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." !d. at 
146. 
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the Court reaffirmed that the process of balancing may 
validate some seizures that are significantly less intrusive than an arrest. The Court in Dunaway, describing the 
holding of Terry, argued that when the intrusion on the citizen's rights "was so much less severe" than that 
contained in a trnditional arrest, the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police 
officer's safety could support the seizure as reasonable. !d. at 209. 
Finally, in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 ( 1981), the Court held that some seizures admittedly covered 
by the fourth amendment constitute such "limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and 
are justified by such substantial governmental interests that they may be made on less than probable 
cause .... " !d. at 699. The balancing process has been criticized. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: 
The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763. 
175. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 10 (1968). 
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of certainty regarding the suspect's participation in criminal activity. 176 The 
level of certainty required, however, will vary depending upon whether the 
seizure is characterized as a stop or as an arrest. Under current case law a 
stop is justified when the police possess a "particularized and objective basis 
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. " 177 An 
arrest, on the other hand, requires a greater quantum and quality of informa-
tion-probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime-than 
that required for a stop. 178 
The intrusiveness of the seizure distinguishes between a stop and an 
arrest. 179 As the intrusiveness of the seizure increases, the reasonableness 
standard of the fourth amendment demands that the justification supporting 
the seizure also increase. But how do we evaluate the intrusiveness of the 
seizure to characterize it as either a stop or an arrest? Unlike the seizure 
issue, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to develop some definite 
standards, although not all the questions have vet been resolved. 
A. General Considerations 
In Adams v. Williams, 180 building on its earlier decision in Terry v. 
Ohio, 181 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for 
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to 
occur or a criminal to escape." 182 Instead, the Court held in Adams that a 
"brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information," will 
be permitted if a reasonable suspicion exists that the individual is, or is about 
to be, engaged in criminal activity. 183 The Court reasoned t~at while this 
activity would be characterized as a seizure, this narrowly drawn authority 
would be deemed reasonable under the fourth amendment in view of the 
limited nature of the intrusion and the substantial societal interest in effective 
law enforcement. 184 The limited nature of the intrusions sanctioned by Terry 
and its progeny, of course, referred to the greater intrusion in the nature of a 
"trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for crime-'arrest' in traditional 
terminology. '' 185 The rationale of Terry has been applied to a variety of cir-
176. /d. 
177. See supra notes 22 & 27-30 and accompanying text. 
178. /d. 
179. /d. 
180. 407 u.s. 143 (1972). 
181. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
182. 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972). In Adams the police officer received a tip from an informant that an 
individual seated in a nearby automobile was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer 
approached the vehicle, tapped on the window, and asked the occupant to open the door. When the suspect 
rolled down the window instead, the officer reached in and removed a gun from the suspect's waistband. /d. at 
144-45. 
183. /d. at 146. 
184. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968). See supra text accompanying note 173. 
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968). The Court never has specifically defined the term "arrest." In 
Terry, however, the Court did make the following statement: "An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal 
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cumstances other than the fortuitous street encounter between policeman and 
citizen, but the basic premise and rationale has remained the same: an officer 
may make a brief stop of a suspicious individual to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information if he has a partic-
ularized and objective basis for suspecting that person of criminal activity. 
Thus, under the narrow authority granted by Terry and with the requisite 
reasonable suspicion, the Court has authorized not only a limited, on-the-
street stop and frisk for weapons, 186 but also border patrol stops, 187 limited to 
a short period of detention and including a brief question or two, to check for 
illegal aliens. In addition, by analogy to the reasoning in Terry, the Court has 
authorized a police officer to order the driver of a vehicle to get out of the 
automobile following a lawful stop for a traffic violation because the intrusion 
is de minimus. 188 Also by analogy to the authority conferred by Terry, the 
Supreme Court has given law enforcement officials the authority to detain, for 
the duration of the search, the occupants of premises being searched under 
the authority of a search warrant. 189 
On the other hand, the Court has held, subsequent to Terry, that the 
concept of arrest is not limited to cases in which the police inform a suspect 
that he is "under arrest," at least as that term is used to indicate the tradi-
tional trip to the station house and the formal commencement of a criminal 
prosecution. 190 In other words, the concept of "stop" is not broad enough to 
cover all detentions short of a formal arrest; specifically, it does not authorize 
extensive detention for purposes of investigation. 191 
The Supreme Court on two occasions has rejected attempts to extend 
Terry to cases that contained a significant detention for investigative pur-
poses. The first case, Davis v. Mississippi, 192 was decided one year after 
Terry. In Davis the police had picked up the accused and transported him to 
the police station, where he was questioned briefly and fingerprinted. The 
State conceded that it lacked probable cause for the detention and did not 
claim that the defendant had voluntarily accompanied the police to the sta-
tion. Nine days later, the police again detained the defendant without prob-
able cause and obtained a second set of prints. The State argued that the 
detention "was of a type which does not require probable cause" because it 
occurred at the "investigative" rather than the "accusatory" stage, and be-
cause it was for the limited purpose of obtaining fmgerprints. 193 The Court 
prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accom-
panied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction 
ultimately follows." !d. at 26. 
186. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
187. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
!88. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). See infra text accompanying notes 223-24. 
189. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 220-21. 
190. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
191. !d. 
192. 394 u.s. 721 (1969). 
193. !d. at 726. The defendant was one of twenty-four black youths brought in and held briefly for 
questioning and fingerprinting. ld. at 722. Following his release the defendant was interrogated on several other 
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rejected the argument that the investigative character of the activity should be 
controlling. The Court further stated that "to argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to miscon-
ceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment" and that "[n]othing is more 
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intru-
sions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be 
termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions."' 194 
The second case, Dunaway v. New York, 195 contained similar facts. In 
Dunaway the police picked up the defendant during a murder investigation 
and took him to police headquarters for questioning. Although the defendant 
was not informed at the time that he was under arrest, he would have been 
physically restrained had he attempted to leave.1% Thus, there was no question 
in Dunaway that the defendant was seized within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. The State also conceded that at the time of the seizure, the police 
lacked probable cause to arrest. The Government argued, instead, that the 
defendant was not under arrest at the time and, thus, the detention was 
permissible because the police did have reasonable suspicion of his participa-
tion in the crime under investigation. 197 The Court refused to extend the 
narrow authority conferred by Terry to a seizure as intrusive as this and 
argued that the extension of the rationale of Terry to this situation would 
"threaten to swallow the general rule that ... seizures are 'reasonable' only 
if based on probable cause." 198 
The reasoning of Dunaway is critical to an analysis of the constitutional 
distinction between the narrow "stop" authority conferred by Terry and its 
progeny and an arrest. In effect, Dunaway held that the concept of"stop" is a 
narrow grant of authority, and that all other seizures-those in which the 
intrusion goes beyond the authority recognized by Terry and related cases-
constitute "arrests" even though they may not necessarily constitute an 
"arrest" as that term traditionally is used. "Arrest," in other words, becomes 
a term of art describing all seizures that include an intrusion on personal 
liberty greater than that conferred under the authority of a stop. In Dunaway 
the Court described the Terry stop as a limited, on-the-street frisk for weap-
ons 199 and described Brignoni-Ponce as an application of Terry to the special 
occasions, sometimes in his home or car, other times at police headquarters. Nine days after the initial deten· 
tion, the defendant again was taken in and held overnight for questioning. The next day he signed a statement, 
but the statement was not introduced at trial. Two days later, while still in jail, he was fingerprinted again. These 
prints were sent to the FBI for analysis and were found to match those taken at the scene of the crime. /d. at 723. 
194. /d. at 726-27. 
195. 442 u.s. 200 (1979). 
1%. /d. at 203. An informant had implicated the defendant in the crime, but the information supplied was 
insufficient to get a warrant. Nevertheless, the investigating officers ordered other officers to pick him up and 
bring him in. Id. 
197. /d. at 206. The Court did not decide whether the officers had reasonable suspicion within the meaning 
of Terry. Instead, it concluded that the nature of the detention went far beyond that authorized by Terry and its 
progeny and, thus, had to be supported by probable cause. /d. at 212-13. 
198. /d. at 213. 
199. Id. at 209. 
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context of roving border patrols that stop automobiles to check for illegal 
aliens. These stops usually consume "less than a minute" and entail "a brief 
question or two." 200 The Court contrasted the facts in Terry and Brignoni-
Ponce with those in Dunaway: 
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken 
from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed 
in an interrogation room. . . . The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was 
under arrest, was not "booked," and would not have had an arrest record if 
the interrogation had proved fruitless, while not insignificant for all purposes, 
... obviously do not make petitioner's seizure even roughly analogous to the 
narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny.201 
Several conclusions may be drawn from Davis and Dunaway. First the 
authority conferred under Terry does not legitimize under the fourth amend-
ment a species of investigative detention. Second, the concept of "stop" has 
both temporal and spatial qualities that are related directly to the intrusive-
ness of the seizure. Since a stop is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment, although reasonable only when based upon reasonable suspi-
cion, it assumes authority to enforce the restriction of liberty or freedom of 
movement entailed therein. The authority that is conferred, however, is lim-
ited by the length of time the deprivation may continue and by the location to 
which the officer may move the encounter. Finally, Dunaway and Davis both 
suggest that the intrusiveness of a seizure in respects other than time and 
location is a circumstance to be considered. In Davis the Government had 
argued that the seizure was reasonable because it was for the limited purpose of 
obtaining fingerprints. The Court rejected that argument because the defendant 
had been interrogated and fingerprinted, but the Court intimated that a 
"narrowly circumscribed procedure for obtaining fingerprints of suspects 
without probable cause" might be permissible under the fourth amendment.202 
200. /d. at 210-11. 
201. /d. at 212. Justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice. /d. at 221. Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the defendant had voluntarily accompanied the officers to the station house for question-
ing. /d. at 223-25. Moreover, assuming that an illegal seizure had occurred, he argued that a sufficient period of 
time had lapsed between the seizure and the confession to render the confession admissible. !d. at 225-27. 
202. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969). Following the Davis decision the Judicial Conference of 
the United States proposed an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that provided a process 
by which a federal magistrate could order a suspect to appear for nontestimonial identification proceedings, such 
as giving fingerprint exemplars, even though probable cause to arrest was lacking. Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 F.R.D. 409 (1971). The proposal never was 
adopted. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
46-47 (1972). Similar proposals have been made by other organizations. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO 
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1970); MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 170.1-.7 (1975). For an analysis of the various proposals, see MODEL 
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 170.1-7, commentary at 459-89 (1975). See also Note, Deten-
tion to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules ofCrlminal 
Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1972); Note, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 
MINN. L. REV. 667 (1972). 
These proposals all provided for the participation of an independent magistrate in the decision to require the 
suspect to appear. While the process still would constitute a deprivation of liberty, the participation of the 
independent magistrate would eliminate some of the potential for abuse and weaken the fourth amendment 
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In Dunaway the Court reaffirmed the principle that the purposes of the 
seizure-considerations other than the length and location thereof-may be 
relevant to the inquiry. The Court stated that "detention for custodial inter-
rogation-regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards 
against illegal arrest.',2°3 
Apart from the major areas of concern-the temporal and spatial scope of 
the seizure and the purposes and other general characteristics of the en-
counter-the cases in the lower federal courts and in the state courts identify 
a myriad of other relevant problems, some of which were described above as 
relevant to the seizure issue, but which may be relevant also to the question 
whether the seizure was a stop or an arrest. These include: First, the question 
from whose perspective the circumstances of the seizure are to be eval-
uated-that is, the intent of the officer, the subjective belief of the person 
seized, or the subjective belief of a reasonable person; second, the relevance 
of the degree of force used or displayed to effectuate the encounter; and third, 
the question whether a statement by the officer that the individual is under 
arrest precludes a finding that the seizure was a stop when the circumstances 
otherwise would dictate such a finding. 
B. Temporal and Spatial Considerations and General "Intrusiveness" 
Concerns 
In both Dunaway and Davis the police seized a suspect and transported 
him to the station house for investigative purposes. In neither case was the 
suspect informed that he was under arrest. In Davis the suspect was held for a 
short period while he was fingerprinted and briefly questioned before being 
released. In Dunaway the suspect was detained at police headquarters for 
over an hour before he made statements and drew sketches that incriminated 
him. In Dunaway, especially, both the length of the detention and its location 
greatly influenced the Court's finding that the seizure was an arrest and, 
accordingly, had to be supported by probable cause (which was lacking at the 
time of the initial seizure). Adams and Brignoni-Ponce also emphasized the 
importance of the temporal and spatial qualities of the detention. Adams 
authorized a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his 
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more in-
formation ... .'' 204 Brignoni-Ponce authorized border patrol agents to stop 
"car[s] briefly and [to] investigate the circumstances that provoke sus-
picion.'' 205 
objection. Cf. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 9 (1973) ("[A] subpoena to appear before a grand jury [to 
provide voice exemplars] is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense."). See infra text accompanying 
note 247. 
203. 442 u.s. 200. 216 (1979). 
204. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). See supra text accompanying note 183. 
205. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
The Court utilized the balancing methodology to uphold a roving border patrol stop made upon reasonable 
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The temporal and spatial scope of the seizure is relevant to the intrusive-
ness issue for a number of reasons. First, as the length of the forced detention 
increases, the associated inconvenience and public stigma also necessarily 
increase. 206 Second, and more important, as the length of the forced detention 
increases, or as its spatial scope changes, the government will have a greater 
opportunity to exploit a police-dominated environment to obtain information. 
Third, at least in some circumstances a change in location will give the police 
an opportunity to obtain information in plain view or to obtain incriminating 
evidence, such as eyewitness identification testimony, 207 in other ways. 
In sum, the temporal and spatial scope of the detention should influence 
the decision to characterize a seizure as a stop or as an arrest for two reasons. 
First, as an abstract, philosophical notion, a lengthy or unlimited assertion of 
government authority to control a citizen's freedom of movement represents 
in itself a substantial intrusion on individual freedom. Second, such an asser-
tion may enhance evidence-gathering objectives that, in a general sense, con-
stitute an additional significant invasion of privacy. 
The length of the encounter alone has been held sufficient to characterize 
a seizure as an arrest. 208 Unfortunately, little consensus appears to exist 
among courts on how long an individual may be detained (or stopped) before 
the seizure becomes an arrest. However, most courts clearly treat the brief 
stop authorized by Terry and its progeny as authority that confers a right to 
detain which is limited by minutes rather than hours. Thus, a detention for a 
"couple of minutes" 209 or for a "short time" 210 has been approved. Other 
courts have found the time lapse sufficient to tum the seizure into an arrest 
when the detention lasted only flfteen minutes. 211 The relevance of the length 
of the detention to the resolution of the question was aptly described by the 
Fourth Circuit in a recent opinion: "We cannot overemphasize the impor-
suspicion. The Court noted the strong' public interest in excluding illegal aliens and the difficult problems 
associated with patrolling the two-thousand-mile border with Mexico. !d. at 882-83. By contrast, the intrusion 
on personal liberty was found to be modest because the duration of the stop seldom exceeded one minute. !d. at 
880. See also supra text accompanying note 174. 
2UI>. See supra rexl a .. companying notes 16-18. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
208. See, e.g., Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967,970 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981). 
209. United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 
(1980) (detention for a couple of minutes did not transform a stop into an arrest). 
210. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 1981). 
211. United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976) (fifteen-minute seizure while home was searched 
held unconstitutional because detention was longer than necessary under the circumstances). See also Sharpe v. 
United States, 660 F.2d 967,970-71 (4th Cir. 1981)(detention for30-40 minutes sufficient to tum detention into de 
facto arrest), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); United States v. Chamberlin, 644 
F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1980) (detention for20 minutes found unlawful), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981); 
United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1979) (three-hour detention at border unlawful in 
absence of probable cause); United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1978) (45-minute detention 
unlawful under the circumstimces); United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d Ill, App. 231, 244 S.E.2d 346,354 
( 1978) (40-minute detention unlawful under the circumstances); Radowick v. States, 145 Ga. 115 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(continuation of detention for 25 minutes unlawful under the circumstances). 
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tance of brevity for investigatory stops ... indeed, it is the transitory nature 
of the stop that justifies the elimination of the probable cause require-
ment."212 
The scope of authority conferred under the Terry stop doctrine to require 
people to move to another location also has proved troublesome to the courts. 
The argument can be made that when the government is permitted to effec-
tuate a change in the spatial circumstances of a detention, the infringement on 
individual liberty necessarily increases. Thus, the form of brief detention for 
investigation authorized by Terry and its progeny would be incompatible with 
an order to move to another location-except, perhaps, when the original 
location constitutes an impediment to the orderly movement of others in the 
area. 213 One could argue that once the government asserts the authority to 
control a person's movement by a positive order to move, the deprivation of 
liberty is at its zenith. Certainly, a qualitative difference exists between the 
assertion of government power to detain an individual at the location that a 
person voluntarily accepted and the assertion of government power to force 
the individual to move to another location. The lower courts, however, have 
for the most part refused to hold that to mandate a change in the location of a 
seizure is inherently inconsistent with the authority conferred by Terry and 
its progeny;214 that is, the seizure will not be transformed into an arrest simply 
because the officer required the individual to get out of his automobile215 or to 
get into the police cruiser, 216 or to return to the location from which he or she 
just came. 217 The airport seizure cases, such as Mendenhall, constitute a class 
212. Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d %7, 970 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982). 
There is substantial support, however, for the position that the length of the detention, standing alone, 
should not be outcome determinative. Professor LaFave has argued that the primary focus of the inquiry should 
be whether the police are pursuing a means of investigation that is likely to resolve the matter one way or 
another very soon and whether it is essential to the inquiry that the suspect remain present. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH, supra note 53, § 9.2(!), at 40. 
Some courts have suggested that the nature of the offense under investigation and the other circumstances 
of the detention are relevant to the question whether the length of the detention was excessive. See State v. 
Merklein, 388 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
213. United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847,851 (9th Cir. 1979) (stop does not become an arrest just because 
officer directs that questioning take place in a less public place); United States v. Oats, 560 F.2d 45, 57 (2d Cir. 
1977) (nothing wrong with moving the location of the detention to a place "more convenient" for questioning 
and "more conducive" to ensuring the safety of the officers). 
214. See, e.g., United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Chatman, 573 
F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977). 
215. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). See infra text accompanying notes 223-24. 
Although Mimms concerned an order to alight following a routine traffic stop, the rationale has been extended to 
circumstances in which the reasonable suspicion that prompted the detention was for nontraffic offenses. 
United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
See generally Comment, Orders to Alight: Opening the Door to a New Traffic Stop and Search and Seizure 
Rule, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. I71, 179-S3 (1981). 
216. See, e.g., Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d %7 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d I I7I (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1113 (1981). 
217. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703-05 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 220-21. See 
also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1127 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); United States 
v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 69-71 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Patino-
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of cases in which the government frequently seeks to alter the location of the 
detention. 218 The dissenting Justices in Mendenhall argued that when the 
agents escorted the defendant from the public area of the terminal to the DEA 
office a short distance away, the deprivation was of the same character as that 
in Dunaway, and probable cause was required to support that intrusion. 219 
While the forcible trip to the station house such as that in Dunaway and 
Davis clearly may be incompatible with the authority conferred by Terry, 
other Supreme Court cases appear to accept some limited authority to order 
the movement of persons briefly detained under the authority of Terry. In 
Michigan v. Summers 220 the seizure occurred as the suspect was descending 
the front steps of his home. He then was ordered to return to the premises and 
remain there while a search was conducted. The Court characterized that 
seizure as substantially less intrusive than an arrest. The Court found that the 
circumstances of the seizure were no more intrusive than the detention of the 
other occupants found inside. 221 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 222 the 
Court held that a selective referral to a secondary inspection station of 
automobiles stopped at a fixed checkpoint constituted a "minimal" intrusion 
and, thus, created no fourth amendment problem beyond that inherent in the 
original stop. Finally, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms 223 the Court upheld the right 
of the police to order a suspect who had been lawfully stopped for a traffic 
violation to get out of the vehicle. The Court found that the additional intru-
sion occasioned by the order to leave the automobile was de minimus and 
argued that the order was neither a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
person" nor significant enough to rise to the level of a "petty indignity. " 224 
While in all three cases the forcible movement ultimately aided in the dis-
covery of evidence that led to a successful prosecution, in none of the cases 
was the change in the location itself clearly designed to enhance evidence-
gathering objectives. Instead, in each of these cases the forcible movement 
Zaibrano, 482 F. Supp. 245, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 208 (1980); United States v. Thevis, 469 F. 
Supp. 490, 501-02 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Wilkerson 
v. United States, 427 A.2d 923, 925-26 (D.C. 1981). 
218. See supra note 151. 
219. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 574-75 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). 
220. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The lawfulness of the detention in Summers was significant because contraband 
was discovered during the course of the search. Once it was determined that the defendant owned the premises, 
he was arrested and searched incident thereto. The heroin found in his pocket was introduced as evidence at 
trial. /d. at 693 n.l. 
221. !d. at 702 n.16. Seven other persons were present at the time. 
222. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Martinez-Fuerte concerned a fiXed checkpoint away from the border, at which all 
vehicles were halted for questioning regarding the possible presence of illegal aliens in the automobile. A 
relatively small number of vehicles then were referred to a secondary area for further questioning. /d. at 546. 
The defendants in Martinez-Fuerte were sent to the secondary inspection station, and further questioning 
revealed that illegal aliens were in the vehicle. /d. at 547. 
223. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). The lawfulness of the order to alight in Mimms was significant 
because when the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, the officer noticed a large bulge under the defendant's 
sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked the defendant and found a loaded 
revolver. The defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a firearm without a license. 
!d. at 107. 
224. !d. at 111. 
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was slight, and each had a plausible justification other than use of the deten-
tion itself as a bootstrap for collateral evidence-gathering objectives. 225 
While a lengthy period of detention and the ability of the government to 
order forcible movement of a suspect in themselves constitute significant 
intrusions on individual liberty and may, without more, be sufficient to re-
quire a finding that a seizure was an arrest rather than a stop, the intrusive-
ness of a seizure-and hence the degree of infringement on fourth amendment 
rights-also may be determined by the purposes or other characteristics 
of the detention. Both Davis and Dunaway suggest that the intrusiveness 
of a seizure should be evaluated, in part, with reference to the extent to 
which the police use the occasion to pursue collateral evidence-gathering 
objectives.2i6 More recently, in Summers the Court confirmed the relevance 
of characteristics of the detention other than its mere length and spatial scope. 
In Summers the Court upheld the right of police to detain the occupants of a 
dwelling during the period necessary to execute a search warrant. 227 The mere 
connection of an occupant to the home that was searched provided the "iden-
tifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity" 
justified tlie detention. 228 The characterization of the detention as a Terry stop 
rather than as an arrest was supported, in part, by the Court's observation 
that this "type of detention . . . is not likely to be exploited by the officer or 
unduly prolonged to gain more information, because the information the 
officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the 
detention. " 229 Finally, the Court also noted that "because the 
detention ... was in [the suspect's] own residence, it could add only mini-
mally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve 
neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit 
to the police station. " 230 Dunaway was described by the Court in Summers as 
a seizure "designed to provide an opportunity for interrogation," whereas the 
detention in Summers was "not likely to have the coercive aspects likely to 
induce self-incrimination." 231 
225. The Court desciibed the purposes of the detention in Summers as follows: To prevent flight in the 
event that incriminating evidence was found; to protect the safety of the officers executing the warrant; and to 
facilitate the search (i.e., to open locked doors and closed containers to avoid delay and damage). 452 U.S. 692, 
702-03 (1981). The Court found that the selective referral to the secondary inspection station in Martinez·Fuerte 
minimized the intrusion on the general public because it eliminated the necessity of questioning the occupants of 
every car. 428 U.S. 543,560 (1976). Finally, the order to alight approved by Mimms was necessary to establish a 
face-to-face confrontation, which diminished the possibility that the driver could make unobserved movements 
that might increase the likelihood of assault on the officer. 434 U.S. 106, I 10 (lm) (per curiam). 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 192-201. 
227. 452 u.s. 692, 705 (1981). 
228. /d. at 703-M. The defendant was one of seven persons present at the time the search warrant was 
executed. How the defendant's mere' presence at the scene, along with others, constituted "articulable and 
individualized" suspicion never was explained. See Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: 
Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49,72 (1981). 
229. 452 u.s. 692, 701 (1981). 
230. /d. at 702. 
231. /d. at 702 n.l5. 
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The extent to which a detention may be utilized to pursue collateral 
evidence-gathering objectives beyond the authority conferred by Terry and its 
progeny-the authority to make a "brief stop ... in order to determine [the 
suspect's] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information" 232-is well described in numerous lower court deci-
sions. 233 While judicial agreement is less than complete, a clear consensus 
apparently exists that some evidence-gathering objectives may be pursued 
under the authority of Terry and its progeny beyond brief questioning and a 
frisk. For example, courts have sustained detentions for relatively short 
periods while computer checks are run to determine whether there are any 
outstanding warrants for the suspect's arrest. 234 Detentions for relatively 
short periods have been permitted to facilitate eyewitness identifications. 235 
Finally, courts have approved detention of a suspect and his possessions so 
that a drug detecting dog could be brought to the area. 236 These cases appear 
to have accepted the thesis developed by Professor LaFave that a Terry 
seizure will not cease to be a limited intrusion simply because collateral 
evidence-gathering objectives are employed, provided that the "police are 
diligently pursuing a means of investigation which is likely to resolve the 
matter one way or another very soon" and that it is "essential to the inves-
tigation that the suspect's presence be continued during that interval." 237 
While Professor LaFave's thesis has gamed widespread acceptance, 238 it 
is difficult to articulate justifications for his position without resorting to the 
relatively short length of the detention in the cases that have used the test to 
support the activities of the police, or without resorting to the limited nature 
of the spatial characteristics of the detention (i.e., on-the-scene detention 
unlike the station house interrogation condemned by Dunaway). The distinc-
tion between the activity condemned by Dunaway and, for example, the 
practice of detaining a suspect on the street while an eyewitness is brought to 
the scene could be justified because the former (custodial interrogation) con-
cerns an independent constitutional interest while the latter (eyewitness iden-
tification) does not. While an individual has an independent constitutional 
right to remain silent, 239 he or she does not have a corresponding independent 
constitutional right to prevent a witness from viewing his or her face or likeness:40 
232. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). 
233. See infra cases cited in notes 234-36. 
234. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 
( 1975) (suspects held for more than one hour while computer check run to determine whether airplane was stolen); 
People v. Higbee, 37 Cal. App. 3d 944, 949, 112 Cal. Rptr. 690, 692 (1974); State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Clark v. State, 171 Ind. App. 658, 663, 358 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 570 F.2d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 
62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); People v. Harris, 15 ail. 3d 384,390-91,540 P.2d632, 
635-36, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540-41 (1975). In Harris, however, the court held the detention for purposes of 
identification unlawful under the circumstances. /d. at 392, 540 P.2d at 637, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 542. 
236. See, e.g., United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 
(7th Cir. 1980); United States v. West, 495 F. Supp. 871 (D. Mass. 1980). 
237. LAFAVE, SEARCH, supra note 53,§ 9.2(f), at 40. See supra text accompanying note 212. 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 234-36. 
239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1966). 
240. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967). 
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Nor, for that matter, does an individual have a constitutional right to prevent 
police from disclosing an outstanding arrest warrant or to prohibit drug detect-
ing dogs from sniffing for contraband. 241 Thus, a distinction exists between 
such cases on grounds other than the temporal and spatial circumstances of 
the detention. One reasonably can ask, however, whether the distinction is 
relevant to the primary issue: whether the detention is one that, considering 
the intrusion on fourth amendment rights, should be permitted on less than 
probable cause. 
This Article suggests that the fourth amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures-the right to control one's own movement-includes 
the right to avoid face-to-face confrontations with law enforcement officials 
except when the confrontation is supported by sufficient justifications. 242 It is 
not necessary to say that one has a constitutional right to hide from the police; 
it is sufficient to say that no government right exists to demand the physical 
presence of the accused at any given time or at any given place, except upon a 
showing of sufficient justification. The exception to the general rule that 
sufficient justification means probable cause, first specifically described in 
Adams, was limited to cases containing a brief stop to maintain the "status 
quo momentarily while obtaining more information." 243 Summers clearly 
established that the authority conferred by Terry and its progeny was not 
limited to the momentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk for 
weapons; rather, the authority conferred under Terry permits limited deten-
tions in which the intrusion on individual rights is significantly less than that 
occasioned by an arrest. 244 The Court in Summers authorized the detention of 
the suspect at his home while a search warrant was executed, since "the type 
of detention imposed here -is --not likely to be exploited by the 
officer . . . because the information the officers seek normally will be ob-
tained through the search and not through the detention." 245 It is quite an-
other matter, however, to authorize a detention upon reasonable suspicion for 
the specific purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence as a direct result of 
the detention. The breadth of the potential infringement on constitutional 
rights flowing from that activity is significantly greater than that which was 
envisioned by Terry and Adams and the narrow authority conferred by 
Summers, Martinez-Fuerte, and Mimms. 246 Qualitatively, little difference 
exists between sanctioning a street encounter, like that concerned in Terry, 
which becomes the vehicle for investigative techniques other than general 
241. United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 
134 Cal. Rptr. 436 ( 1977). The right to avoid contact with law enforcement officers is lost, of course, once a 
person has been arrested with probable cause. The police may monitor the movements of an arrestee as their 
judgment dictates. Washington v. Chrisman, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1982). 
242. The Court has recognized that the general right of privacy includes the right to be let alone. Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
243. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
244. 452 u.s. 692, 700.01 (1981). 
245. !d. at 70 I. 
246. See supra text accompanying notes 220-24. 
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questioning, and approving temporary station house investigative detentions 
any time reasonable suspicion exists that a person has committed a crime and 
that the individual's presence is needed for evidence-gathering objectives. If 
the government has the right to require individuals reasonably suspected of 
criminal activity to appear at the station house for viewing by eyewitnesses or 
for fingerprinting, or to bring in their possessions for inspection (although 
probable cause -is lacking), the infringement on fourth amendment interests 
might be less than that occasioned by fortuitous street encounters. At least in 
some of these cases the public stigma associated with a street encounter could 
be avoided. The individual could arrange to appear at a convenient time and 
possibly could challenge the lawfulness of the intrusion before it occurs by 
seeking to quash or enjoin the process. 247 Unless the Supreme Court restricts 
the authority conferred under the rationale of Terry and Summers by limiting 
the right to exploit the detention for collateral evidence-gathering objectives, 
it will have come, by indirection, dangerously close to authorization for in-
vestigative detentions upon less than probable cause, something that the 
Supreme Court continuously has refused to authorize when the issue has been 
confronted directly. 248 
C. Other Concerns: The Use of Force and the Reasonable Person Focus 
Earlier, in the discussion of the seizure problem, this Article noted that 
courts have held that neither the subjective intent or belief of the police, nor 
the subjective belief of the individual concerned, is relevant to the resolution 
of the problem. Rather, the courts have taken the position that a person has 
been seized only when, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person 
would have thought that his or her freedom of movement had been restricted 
by the activities oflaw enforcement officials. 249 The nuances of this method of 
analysis never have been explored fully by the courts, but the use of this test 
clearly directs the focus of inquiry, at least in some cases, to the perception 
rather than the fact of a restriction offreedom of movement. In the absence of 
actual physical restraint on freedom of movement, or of words which clearly 
indicate that the person is not free to leave, the perception that is generated in 
the eyes of a reasonable person from the otherwise ambiguous words and 
conduct of the police will determine whether freedom of movement is re-
stricted. Although the reasonable person standard is the purported test for all 
cases, in some cases-those in which, for example, physical force is used that 
impedes freedom of movement-the facts will ordain the outcome and little is 
achieved by the use of a reasonable person standard. If a person suffers actual 
physical restraints or is told that he or she is not free to leave, a fortiori that 
247. See In re Melvin, 546 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1977) (granting writ of mandamus to quash order issued by 
district court at request of United States Attorney that compelled defendant to appear for a lineup); see also 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PR09EDURE § 170.6, commentary at 487-88 (1975). 
248. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1%9). 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14. 
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person has been seized. In other cases, however, if the acts are ambiguous, the 
use of a reasonable person standard may be outcome determinative. 
The same problem occurs when the question is whether a seizure was a 
stop or an arrest. Most courts that have considered the problem have held that 
the question must be resolved by determining how a reasonable person would 
have viewed the circumstances. 250 Thus, for example, if the officer who par-
ticipated in the detention subjectively intended to release the individual after a 
few questions and, perhaps, a frisk, assuming that no additional incriminating 
facts are revealed, that intent would be irrelevant if the facts otherwise con-
vey the impression-viewed from the eyes of a reasonable person-that the 
person was under arrest from the outset. Conversely, the detained individ-
ual's subjective belief that he or she was under arrest would be irrelevant if 
the facts, seen through the eyes of a reasonable person, disclosed that the 
detention was of a limited nature-that is, one which would result in prompt 
release of the individual following a few brief questions, assuming that no 
additional incriminating evidence developed. 
Examination of the cases discloses, however, that the reasonable person 
standard, even when specifically accepted as the test (and in many cases no 
references are made to the question), plays an insignificant role in the out-
come of most cases when the issue is whether the person was stopped or 
arrested. The absence of either a specific reference to the proper method of 
analysis or evidence that the reasonable person standard played a significant 
role in the outcome is explained by the judicial conclusion that the objective 
facts, themselves, ordain the outcome. In other words, if the detention lasted 
a significant period of time, or if the individual seized was taken to the station 
house for questioning, these facts-and not a reasonable person's perception 
of them-will determine the outcome. 251 In cases containing the problem 
whether a detention constituted a stop or an arrest, more importance seems to 
be placed on objective facts than in cases in which the problem is whether an 
encounter between a police officer and citizen constituted a seizure. In the 
latter category of cases, in which the relevant objective facts generally are 
lacking, the perception of a reasonable person will control, assuming that the 
totality of the circumstances otherwise is ambiguous. 
In two classes of cases, however, use of the reasonable person standard 
appears to be important when the problem is whether the detention was a stop 
or an arrest. One type of case concerns the question of the appropriate weight 
to be given to the degree of force used to effectuate the encounter. Numerous 
decisions in the lower federal courts have accepted the premise that the 
250. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625,632 (9th Cir. 1981) (question is whether, under all 
the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was under arrest); United States v. Vargas, 633 
F.2d 891, 896 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1979). 
251. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), for example, the Court was concerned with the extent 
to which the detention exceeded the narrowly circumscribed intrusions that occurred in Terry and its progeny 
and the indistinguishable nature of the detention from that of a traditional arrest. See generally United States v. 
Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Blum, 614 F.2d 537,539-40 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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degree of force is relevant to the question whether the seizure was a stop or an 
arrest. 252 Initially, it is difficult to understand why the use or display of force 
should affect the outcome. Both a stop and an arrest are seizures within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment; by definition, once a person has been 
seized he or she has no right to leave, and the right to detain the suspect must 
include the right to enforce that detention by the use of force, if necessary. 
Therefore, it is difficult to justify the position that the use of force or the degree 
of force used to effectuate the seizure should, standing alone, constitute an 
objective circumstance indicating that the person was under arrest, or alterna-
tively, a circumstance that a reasonable person would consider indicative of 
an arrest. Nonetheless, on occasion some courts have ruled that the use of 
excessive force, under the circumstances, may transform a stop into an 
arrest. 253 On the other hand, most courts have held that use of force in making 
the seizure will not convert what is otherwise a Terry stop into an arrest, 
especially if the use of force occurred under circumstances justifying reason-
able fear for the safety of the officers or if it was precipitated by the conduct of 
the individual seized. 254 Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to explain 
why consideration of the use of force or the degree of force used should be 
relevant. One possible justification, but one that never has been specifically 
proffered by a court, is that a person has been arrested (rather than merely 
subjected to a Terry stop) whenever the intrusiveness of the detention, deter-
mined by objective factors such as the length, spatial scope, and other intru-
sive characteristics of the detention, exceeds the brief stop for general ques-
tioning authorized by Terry and its progeny, or whenever a reasonable person 
would think that he or she was under arrest. If the latter standard is utilized as 
part of the test, then it is possible to accept the premise that the degree of 
force used to effectuate the seizure is a relevant factor. The use of these 
considerations means, of course, that a court must be prepared to determine 
at what point a reasonable person would view the degree of force used as 
252. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Courts have generally upheld stops 
made at gunpoint when the threat of force has been viewed as reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
officer."). See also United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978); United 
States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977); United States v. Diggs, 522 
F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Floyd v. United States, 429 U.S. 852 (1976); United States v. 
Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Knight v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975). 
253. United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974) (encircling a suspect's car and ordering him out 
at gunpoint held an arrest). The court in Strickler stated: 
[W]e simply cannot equate an armed approach to a surrounded vehicle whose occupants have been 
commanded to raise their hands with the ''brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his 
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information" which was 
authorized in Williams. 
Id. at 380. See also United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, 516 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Lampkin, 464 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1972). 
An interesting variation on the relevance of the use of display of arms is the problem presented by the use of 
other techniques designed to immobilize the suspect, such as handcuffing. Compare United States v. Purry, 545 
F.2d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (handcuffing the suspect did not convert detention into arrest), with People v. 
Tebedo, 81 Mich. App. 535, 539, 265 N. W .2d 406, 408 (1978) (handcuffing not permited under authority to stop). 
254. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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greater than that ordinarily or necessarily associated with a police officer's 
request to stop and answer a few questions. 
Another class of cases in which the decision to employ the reasonable 
person standard may affect the outcome is that category of cases in which the 
officer initiating the encounter subjectively intended to arrest and affirma-
tively indicated that the person was under arrest255 or, alternatively, gave the 
Miranda warnings prior to questioning. 256 An appropriate use of the reason-
able person standard would be to hold that the officer's subjective intent to 
arrest is not outcome determinative if that subjective intent was not conveyed 
to the person detained and if the circumstances of the detention otherwise 
were indicative of a stop. 257 On the other hand, if the officer told the person 
that he or she was under arrest or gave the suspect the Miranda warnings, use 
of the reasonable person test would require a finding that the person was 
arrested even though the intrusiveness of the detention did not exceed that of 
a Terry stop. Several courts, however, by what would appear to be clearly 
erroneous reasoning, have held that since the subjective intent or belief of the 
officer is not controlling, a finding that the seizure was a stop will not be 
foreclosed even if the officer told the person that he or she was under arrest 
provided that the other objective circumstances of the seizure are consistent 
with a Terry stop. 258 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Providing definite standards for defining the dimensions of the concept of 
seizure and for distinguishing between stops and arrests will require further 
judicial attention. While the essential components of these concepts have 
been developed, the Supreme Court has yet to provide standards that will 
produce consistent and logical treatment of the issues in the lower courts and 
workable guidelines for law enforcement officials. 
The complexity of the problems is exacerbated by the richness in diver-
sity of confrontations between citizens and law enforcement officials. The 
nuances of activities and words used by law enforcement officials effectuating 
an encounter with a citizen are infinite in their variety. The tests that are 
promulgated must be both specific and flexible at the same time since the 
nature of encounters may change rapidly, and what may have commenced as 
a voluntary encounter may escalate quickly into a full-scale arrest, although 
the police may not have formalized the result by indicating that the person 
was under arrest. 
255. People v. Baker, 12 Cal. App. 3d 152, 90 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1970); People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399,517 
P.2d 1336 (1973), rev'd on habeas corpus appeal sub nom. Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976); 
State v. Walton, 159 N.J. Super. 408, 388 A.2d 268 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
256. Cf. United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 898 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1981). At the very minimum, the giving of 
the Miranda warning should constitute persuasive evidence that a seizure occurred, given the public's associa-
tion of the warning with arrest. 
257. United States v. Vargas, 633 F.2d 891, 896 (1st Cir. 1980). 
258. See supra cases cited at note 255. 
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Beyond the inherent value of providing definite standards, further judi-
cial attention to these problems is warranted because the Supreme Court has 
yet to articulate fully the values implicated by the fourth amendment limita-
tions on seizures of people. This Article has advanced the argument that the 
concept of seizure, including variations in the form of a stop and an arrest, 
involves considerations other than the mere restriction of freedom of move-
ment. The right of a citizen to unrestricted freedom of movement surely 
includes the right to avoid contact with law enforcement officials at will 
(except when the contact is supported by the constitutionally mandated justi-
fication) when the contact will serve as an essential link in the develop-
ment of evidence. Because a police-citizen encounter normally entails an 
intrusion on personal privacy beyond that of a simple restriction of freedom of 
movement, that intrusion must be a relevant consideration in determining 
whether a seizure occurred. To ignore intrusions other than a direct restric-
tion of freedom of movement invites, by indirection, the legitimization of 
investigative detentions on less than probable cause, which, heretofore, has 
been rejected. 
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